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ABSTRACT 
Critical Infrastructures play a central role in the world around us and are the backbone of everyday 
life. Their service provision has become more widespread, to the point where it is now practically 
ubiquitous in many societies. Critical Infrastructure assets contribute to the economy and society 
as a whole. Their impact on the security, economy and health sector are extremely vital. Critical 
Infrastructures now possess levels of automation that require the integration of, often, mutually 
incompatible technologies. Their increasing complexity has led to the creation of direct and 
indirect interdependent connections amongst the infrastructure groupings. In addition, the data 
generated is vast as the intricate level of interdependency between infrastructures has grown.  
Since Critical Infrastructures are the backbone of everyday life, their protection from cyber-threats 
is an increasingly pressing issue for governments and private industries. Any failures, caused by 
cyber-attacks, have the ability to spread through interconnected systems and are a challenge to 
detect; especially as the Internet is now heavily reliant on Critical Infrastructures. This has led to 
different security threats facing interconnected security systems. Understanding the complexity of 
Critical Infrastructure interdependencies, how to take advantage of it in order to minimize the 
cascading problem, enables the prediction of potential problems before they happen.  
Therefore, this work firstly discusses the interdependency challenges facing Critical 
Infrastructures; and how it can be used to create a support network against cyber-attacks. In much, 
the same way as the human immune system is able to respond to intrusion. Next, the development 
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of a distributed support system is presented. The system employs behaviour analysis techniques to 
support interconnected infrastructures and distribute security advice throughout a distributed 
system of systems. The approach put forward is tested through a statistical analysis methodology, 
in order to investigate the cascading failure effect whilst taking into account the independent 
variables. Moreover, our proposed system is able to detect cyber-attacks and share the knowledge 
with interconnected partners to create an immune system network. The development of the 
‘Critical Infrastructure Auto-Immune Response System’ (CIAIRS) is presented with a detailed 
discussion on the main segments that comprise the framework and illustrates the functioning of 
the system. A semi-structured interview helped to demonstrate our approach by using a realistic 
simulation to construct data and evaluate the system output.   
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GLOSSARY 
 Asset: A hardware or software component that needs to be protected from attacks.  
 Artificial Immune Systems (AIS): Solving real-world problems by intelligent methodologies 
inspired by the organic immune system. 
 Behavioural Observation: A technique that is used to observe, evaluate and calculate the 
behaviour of a system.  
 Big Data: Extremely large blocks of data that can be used to discover system behaviour by 
analysing patterns, trends and different information related to the system.   
 Control Centre: When a control system is managed by an operational centre. The control centre 
includes SCADA and HMI systems.  
 Critical Infrastructure (CI): The arrangement of both systems and assets, which are essential 
and affect the security, economy, public health or safety of a nation. 
 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP): The awareness and the action toward an attack in the 
Critical Infrastructure. 
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 Cyber-Attack: Digital attacks that are attempted by a hacker to compromise information by 
hacking a network or information system.  
 Cyber-Security: Using measures to protect information systems or a network from cyber-
attacks. 
 Data Analytics: Concerned with improving the productivity of a system by qualitative and 
quantitative techniques in order to draw a conclusion about a set of data. 
 Descriptive Statistic: Refers to data analysis by summarizing or describing the number of 
features; such as the mean, standard deviation and mode. 
 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): An American agency established in order to protect 
the environmental health.  
 Human Machine Interface (HMI): The process of an industrial control system through a user 
interface. The transferred information is managed and monitored by a control system operator.  
 Industrial Control System (ICS): Refers to different types of control systems. In addition, it 
relates to an industrial process that is operated by systems, devices and networks.   
 Master Station (MS): Involved in the industrial protocol communication session by monitoring 
the asset. Moreover, the station handles time management and synchronisation.      
 Modbus: The Modicon Bus protocol, responsible for communication between the industrial 
control assets.   
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 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC): Is an industrial device that is responsible for collecting 
data from the input and output to create an automated control loop. These loops are created with 
logical programs. 
 Remote Terminal Unit (RTU): Is a device that uses a remote location process in order to 
combine remote communication programs with logical programs. 
 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA): Monitors and controls an infrastructure’s 
operation. The system consists of two main parts: MTU and RTU. The MTU (Master Terminal 
Unit) acts as the brain of the system and the RTU (Remote Terminal Units) collects the data 
locally and sends it to the MTU. The Internet has increased the number of external connections 
to SCADA systems, making them more vulnerable to cyber-attack. 
 Simulation: A method for teaching students to imitate elements of real-world processes, 
overriding difficulties, such as material cost or human resources. 
 Simulation Environment: Using software simulation to imitate real systems.  
 System of Systems: This is a collection of connected tasks or interdependent systems, which 
form part of a larger and more complex system. 
 Tecnomatix: A highly comprehensive simulation program developed by Siemens. Used to 
evaluate the proposed system, from the process layout and the constructed of product lifecycle 
management. 
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 Threats: Something/someone that can exploit a vulnerability (both intentionally and 
accidentally) to obtain, damage or destroy an asset.  
 Vulnerability: A weakness in a system that can be exploited by attackers to damage or break 
into the system. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Foreword 
Over the last decade, Critical Infrastructure complexity has raised a number of challenges and 
prompted the use of intelligent software and simulations to address and achieve effective cyber-
security solutions [1]. However, the breadth of technologies, organisations and interoperating 
systems that comprise Critical Infrastructures, makes security particularly challenging [2]. 
Therefore, new techniques are required to investigate innovative areas of technology in order to 
safeguard critical systems against a growing cyber-threat [3]. Considerable effort has been 
expended on the protection of Critical Infrastructures; it is still an ongoing and persistent challenge 
[4]. One significant challenge is overcoming the lack of understanding about the interdependency 
scheme within Critical Infrastructure groupings. Moreover, there is no single approach about how 
the elements of a Critical Infrastructure affect a connected partner [5] [6]. 
As such, this research takes the concept of a human immune system to simplify and predict 
potential problems before they spread through a network of infrastructures. Therefore, this chapter 
starts by introducing Critical Infrastructures, highlighting the motivation behind the research. In 
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addition, the aims and objectives are presented, as are the novelties of the research. The chapter is 
concluded with an overview of the thesis structure. 
1.2 Critical Infrastructures  
During the last century, a massive growth in Critical Infrastructure groupings has occurred, leading 
to issues, such as interdependency [7]. Researchers and organisations were traditionally focused 
on exploring and understanding Critical Infrastructure behaviour to make the system more 
productive rather than understanding the different threats and attacks that can influence the system 
and the different modelling features that need to be studied in order to explore the Critical 
Infrastructures interconnectivity [8]. Therefore, this section presents a brief background of the 
Critical Infrastructures and the interdependency challenge. 
1.2.1 Brief of Critical Infrastructures  
Critical Infrastructures play a significant role in the world around us. Their service provision has 
become more widespread, to the point where it is ubiquitous in many societies [9]. To maintain 
continuous supply, infrastructure interconnectivity has become highly complex; particularly due 
to the increase in demand for amenities. This has led to an increased interdependence between 
infrastructures and their underlying physical layers. One infrastructure’s provision relies heavily 
on another [10]. Due to this increased connectivity, now, more than ever before, Critical 
Infrastructures face a number of possible digital threats. As a result, Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) has become a significant research topic [11]. Infrastructure is the main source of 
development and economic construction in any country, and different types of urban development 
depend on the size and the provision of infrastructure elements, which help guide the development 
of new areas [12]. Critical Infrastructures have an important influence in an urban environment 
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[13]. However, many infrastructures, such as power plants, are considered outdated and are 
difficult to repair [14].  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology define Critical Infrastructures in the Executive 
Order (EO) as any physical or virtual system and their assets that affect the nation’s security, public 
economy and health service by their failure or damage occurring to them [13]. Critical 
Infrastructure assets are also explained by Command et al., and can be divided into three 
categories. First, the physical assets, which could be tangible or intangible. Secondly, human 
assets, that can represent vulnerabilities by having privileged access to important information or 
systems. Third, cyber assets, which include hardware, software and data, which all serve the 
network functionality [15]. 
Critical infrastructure security attracts the attention of various research fields. Yusufovna et al., 
for example, discuss energy resources, finance, food, health, government services, manufacturing, 
law and legislation, including transportation [16]. In addition, Baud et al., include additional areas, 
such as water, information and telecoms, chemical, industry, agriculture, postal and shipping, and 
defence [17].   
1.2.2 Brief of Interdependency  
Due to global expansion of technology and with the Internet revolution, infrastructures have 
become highly complex and have increased the interdependency at the physical and network layers 
[18]. Therefore, interdependency is considered to be one of the characteristics that can raise several 
concerns; in particular the analysis and modelling of interdependencies due to the complicated 
interactions [19]. This interdependency challenge, within the Critical Infrastructure system-of-
systems, has the potential to cause a cascading effect, with unprecedented disastrous outcomes. 
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Therefore, understanding the interconnectivity behaviour between Critical Infrastructures and how 
it changes depending on the complexity, can help in reducing the effect before cascading occurs 
[20]. This would control the damage and limit the impact [21]. Every new interdependency reveals 
a fresh vulnerability in the interconnected infrastructure groups, which creates new attacks risks 
[22]. 
A number of factors contribute to make the interdependency more complex. For example, 
timescales, geographic scales, cascading and higher order effects, social/psychological elements, 
operational procedures business policies, restoration and recovery procedures, government 
regulatory, legal, policy regimes and finally stakeholder concerns [23]. These aspects can have a 
detrimental impact on the system, so services need to be secured against any type of attack and 
mitigation plans should be in place to counter the effects of other disasters [24]. In order to achieve 
this, security planning must anticipate on a large-scale. 
1.3 Motivation  
Although there are a considerable number of studies focused on Critical Infrastructure research; 
many of them tend to focus on understanding the improvement of Critical Infrastructures, 
modelling the infrastructure, or examining different classifiers to improve the efficiency of Critical 
Infrastructures. However, these studies are limited by the fact that challenges related to 
interdependency caused by fast expansion are ignored. In addition, little research has been done to 
study the communication between Critical Infrastructure and how interdependency can be used as 
a progressive point to improve the level of security and moderate the cascading problem.  
Therefore, the main motivation behind this thesis is based on two main aspects. Firstly, Critical 
Infrastructure tolerance towards growing cyber threats and secondly, the interdependency effect 
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between the Critical Infrastructures and how modelling can help to understand the challenges that 
interconnectivity incurs.  
1.3.1 Cyber Threats Risks  
One necessity in our life that cannot be dispensed with is the Internet. The Internet has an important 
role in the dissemination of ideas, news and policies, cultures and economic transactions. The 
significant expansion of the Internet has allowed criminals to exploit systems [25] [26]. Despite 
the remarkable growth in research to develop systems to ensure the necessary protection, attackers 
on the Internet work in parallel to enhance their own approaches [27].  
There is no safe way to protect against intrusion, whatever the strength of protection. Therefore, it 
takes constant vigilance and advanced technology to mitigate the effects of cyber-attacks [28]. 
Billions have been spent on defending Britain against cyber-attacks and new cyber security 
strategies have helped, to some extent, contain the growth of criminal organisations [29]. However, 
understanding all the assets an organisation needs to protect against to reduce the risk of threats is 
impossible. Tovey et al., highlighted the scale of the problem and compared the average IT 
spending with the average revenue loss after the occurrence of cyber-attacks on different sectors 
in the UK. It was clear that utilities, energy and mining sectors had the second highest level in 
spending on IT at 6% whilst having the highest revenue loss as a result of cyber-attacks [30]. 
Yet Giannopoulos, et al., argue that security spending should remain high, to ensure ongoing 
protection of Critical Infrastructures, such as, the power grid, the transport network and 
information and communication systems and their services they provide [31]. Since any damage 
within the Critical Infrastructures by any means, whether accidental, such as by natural disasters, 
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or intentional by terrorism, and criminal activity, might have negative consequences on the security 
of the EU and directly affect citizens [31]. 
After the terrorist attacks in 2001, many works were focusing on securing the Water Critical 
Infrastructure. However, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), who are committed to 
protecting drinking water and wastewater utility systems, did not implement protocols that met a 
specific security level until 2005. Moreover, most security enhancements were implemented for 
free by organisations [32]. In 2010, the EPA revealed one of their developed policies for the water 
system, which concerns improving the water planning process and the security level of the system 
[33]. However, the water system infrastructure is a unique challenge due to the need to constantly 
repair or replace services, due to faults caused by weather changes, population growth and cyber 
attacks [34]. 
1.3.2 Interdependency Effects  
As a result in the growth of the terrorist attacks on Critical Infrastructures, it is becoming important 
to focus on the CIP [35]. Especially given that Critical Infrastructures are becoming more complex 
and interconnected [36]. With this advance in complexity, a high risk of failure is predicted from 
one Critical Infrastructure to another. Although considerable effort has been expended on the 
protection of Critical Infrastructures, it is still an ongoing and persistent challenge [37]. Various 
reasons make this challenge hard; one of them is the lack of a method for completely understanding 
the interdependency scheme within Critical Infrastructure groupings [38]. 
Taking the impact of the 2008 Chinese winter storm on several Critical Infrastructures as an 
example; the storm affected several Critical Infrastructures by ice and heavy snow causing huge 
economic damage. However, it also showed the level of interconnectivity between electricity 
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power outages, transportation and communication networks and the effect this has on service 
delivery. Rong et al., detail a data analysis process that can be used to understand the 
interdependency within the Critical Infrastructures [39], [40]. Therefore, understanding the links 
between Critical Infrastructures that simplify the structure and predict potential problems before 
they happen is an essential process in protecting against cascading failure.  
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
The inspiration behind this thesis is to detail the development of an approach called Critical 
Infrastructure Automated Immuno-Response System (CIAIRS), which increases the level of 
security for interconnected Critical Infrastructure by predicting and communicating potential 
cyber-attacks before they spread through a network of infrastructures. Consequently, the aims of 
this thesis are presented as follows: 
 To investigate the extent to which Critical Infrastructures are interconnected. 
 To develop an effective response to the challenges in Critical Infrastructures as a result of 
their interconnectivities. 
 To explore how the interdependency between Critical Infrastructures affects their 
individual systems. 
 To design a system that understands the behaviour of system data and classifies it as either 
normal or abnormal, depending on data distributions. The system aims to increase the level 
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of security for the Critical Infrastructure and to ensure Critical Infrastructures can refine 
and improve the way attacks are handled. 
 To understand interdependency modelling methods in order to produce an adequate 
simulation environment that can be used for experimentation and realistic data 
construction. 
 To demonstrate a technique for the detection of abnormal behaviour within a Critical 
Infrastructure and offer an approach for sharing the information with other infrastructures. 
In order to achieve the above aims the following objectives need to be accomplished, which have 
been designated as fundamental to the research: 
 Research into related literature, concerning CIP, the interdependency modelling challenge, 
Critical Infrastructure simulation models, Critical Infrastructure security, data analysis and 
data classifiers. 
 Research into the impact of Critical Infrastructure interdependency and identify the 
influence on the interdependencies, which cause devastating damage. 
 Evaluate and examine various modelling methods used for interdependency challenges. 
 Find available software that covers the requirements to implement the system prototype in 
order to evaluate the effectiveness of the system. 
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 Create a case study through different simulations in order to shape the idea of the research 
in real life depending on semi-structured interview. 
 Implement and evaluate different case studies in order to measure the performance of the 
simulation and the system in detecting the abnormal behaviour effects on other Critical 
Infrastructures. 
 Examine data classifiers and detect the best data classification process, which will help in 
identifying the behaviour of the Critical Infrastructure pattern. 
 The publication of the results obtained during the research. 
1.5 Novelties 
Through the process of this research, fulfilling the aims and objectives were important in order to 
accomplish the research’s novelty. The novelties include the production of an innovative system 
to support the prediction of abnormal behaviour in Critical Infrastructure systems before they 
become serious and affect other interconnected systems. This is especially important in the context 
of our increasing dependence on Critical Infrastructures, along with their increasing complexity. 
The novelties in this work can be summarised as follows: 
 The novelty of the CIAIRS design depends on understanding the behaviour of the attacks 
rather than using the known attack signatures. By using the behavioural observation 
process attacks can be generalised and predicted before they occur.  
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 CIAIRS is able to detect cyber-attacks and share the knowledge with interconnected 
partners. Potential cyber-attacks are detected and the potential impact is predicted before 
they spread through a network of infrastructures. This is inspired by the human immune 
system approach. Big data analysis techniques are used to identify and share threats 
between different infrastructures. This technique is a novel application since it contains a 
number of components that shape the idea of using behaviour observation, classification 
and communication links depending on the interconnectivity between Critical 
Infrastructures [41], [42]. 
 Collecting data in real-time will allow the system to be sophisticated in processing a fast 
response toward any new abnormal behaviour. 
 Current work focuses on shielding Critical Infrastructures. Whereas this research aims to 
develop a solution that both shields and shares the attack information with connected 
partners. The communication process for sharing attack information between the different 
partners is one of the novelties of the design. This process is divided into three main stages: 
decision, inner-process and action. In addition, the use of response and recommendation 
processes are also novel [43]. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is divided into 7 chapters and presents the research idea using a logical scientific 
methodology. These chapters are as follows: 
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 Chapter 2: Background: this chapter provides background information on three main 
topics, which will shape the main idea of the research. The first sub-section is the 
background on the Critical Infrastructure. This section focuses on defining the Critical 
Infrastructure, highlighting different Critical Infrastructure types and the different 
challenges that are faced. The second sub-section is on interdependency in Critical 
Infrastructures. This sub-section indicates the main four categories for interdependency, 
and presents some of the interconnectivity modelling examples. The final sub-section 
covers cyber-attacks and the challenges Critical Infrastructures face. 
 Chapter 3: Literature Review: this chapter presents Critical Infrastructures, big data and 
the use of the analytics in prediction. In addition, the chapter indicates a pattern of 
communication used in the framework that is based on the publish-subscribe design 
methodology. Simulation is also discussed in this chapter which explains the importance 
of simulation and how it can be a useful tool for the advancement of Critical Infrastructure 
security. The chapter highlights the simulation types and the role of using it to protect 
Critical Infrastructures. Finally, an in-depth discussion on machine learning is presented. 
 Chapter 4: Critical Infrastructure Automated Immuno-Response System (CIAIRS): this 
chapter provides a detailed discussion on our methodology and proposed system. Initially, 
the system requirements and the system location within the ICS layers are discussed. In 
addition, a number of scenarios are presented.  Next, the system framework is presented in 
detail and each component is individually explained.  
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 Chapter 5: Implementation: this chapter applies CIAIRS to a simulated scenario based on 
a real-world critical infrastructure in the Saudi Water Ministry using the Siemens 
Tecnomatix system. This infrastructure is used to present the flow and behaviour of data 
in order to study the effect it has on Critical Infrastructures. The chapter explains the 
simulation environment and program used (Siemens Tecnomatix Plant Simulation). The 
simulation is used to construct normal and the abnormal data. The components and the 
process flow for each is described detail. The chapter also explains the best practices for 
presenting a productive environment. Two Critical Infrastructures, the electricity and 
water, are used to present the flow material. Finally, a snapshot of the normal and abnormal 
water data is presented. 
 Chapter 6: Evaluation: This chapter present the outcome of the semi-structured interview. 
This chapter also discusses the classification results for normal and abnormal behaviour 
using data obtained through simulation. 
 Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work: In this final chapter, the main achievements and 
limitations in the research are discussed. The chapter starts by stating recommendations for 
real-life Critical Infrastructures depending on the implication of the research findings. The 
chapter and thesis ends with some discussion of future work as a continuation of this 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
 Introduction 
A country’s foundation depends on its Critical Infrastructures. Protecting them ensures the 
safeguarding of the economy as the Critical Infrastructure assets contribute to the society as a 
whole [44]. However, their increasing complexity has led to the creation of direct and indirect 
interdependent connections amongst the infrastructure groupings. In addition, the datasets 
generated are vast and intricate [45]. Any failures, caused by cyber-attacks have the ability to 
spread through a system of systems and are a challenge to detect [46].  
Therefore, this section, discusses the Critical Infrastructure in depth, focusing on a number of 
points, such as the challenges facing Critical Infrastructure interdependency. 
 Critical Infrastructure 
This research looks into understanding the links between Critical Infrastructures, in order to 
simplify the systematic use of these structures and to predict potential problems before they occur. 
However, the interdependence between Critical Infrastructures still presents a dilemma [47]. As 
with any other system, Critical Infrastructures face a number of possible attacks. As such, CIP has 
become the focus of many researchers’ attentions for some time and has become a cause of concern 
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to governments and private sectors around the world. As a result, CIP has become an important 
research topic [48][25]. In this section, a background discussion is put forward on the definition 
of a Critical Infrastructure, the challenges they face and the risks posed by infrastructure 
interconnectivity. 
2.2.1 Background 
A number of different definitions can be found for the term Critical Infrastructure (CI). Therefore, 
we choose to present two of these definitions that were comprehensive in identifying the meaning 
of Critical Infrastructure. 
Moteff et al., define Critical Infrastructures in various ways, one of them being as the arrangement 
of both systems and assets, which are essential and can affect the security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters of a society by their 
failure or damage [49]. A similar definition regarding Critical Infrastructure was given by 
Command et al., [15]. On the other hand, Moteff, et al., also indicate that Critical Infrastructures 
are a structure of mutually dependent networks and specific industry systems, organizations and 
actions and distribution capabilities that supply vital products and services for the protection and 
financial security of society [49].  
Infrastructure is the main source of development and economic construction process of any 
country. Different types of urban development depend on the size and the provision of 
infrastructure elements, which help guide the development of new areas [50]. Critical 
Infrastructures have an important influence in an urban environment. However, many 
infrastructures, such as power plants, are considerably outdated and difficult to repair [13].  
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The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines Critical Infrastructures as any 
physical or virtual system and assets that would affect the nation’s security, public economy and 
health service by failure or damage occurring to them [13]. 
Critical Infrastructure assets are also explained by Command et al., and can be divided into three 
groups: physical assets (which could be tangible or intangible), human assets (that can represent 
vulnerabilities by having privileged access to important information) or systems cyber assets 
(which include hardware, software and data, and which all serve the network functionality) [15]. 
Moreover, Critical Infrastructure security attracts the attention of various research fields. The 
Critical Infrastructure's common areas were devolved during time and Yusufovna et al., indicate 
these areas as follows [16]: 
 Energy resources  Finance  Food 
 Health  Government services  Manufacturing 
 Law and legislation  Transportation  People and education  
In addition, Baud et al., include additional areas, such as water, information and telecoms, 
chemical, industry, agriculture, postal, shipping and the defence industry [17]. 
However, the relevant assets of these Critical Infrastructures differ depending on the interest of the 
country, geopolitical developments or the security policy in question [49]; Table 1 presents an 
example of the different assets. 
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Table 1: Assets in Critical Infrastructures (in the US) from 1983-2003 [49] 
 
2.2.2 Infrastructures Characteristics: Challenges  
This section begins by illustrating some of the characteristics of Critical Infrastructures to help in 
clarifying the features, which the infrastructure holds within its systems. The infrastructure is 
capable of changing its geographical state depending on system expansion [51]. This has led to 
Critical Infrastructures being considered as an interdependent set of infrastructures [19].  
There are three elements of Critical Infrastructures, which are particularly important in order to 
understand the behaviour of these infrastructures from a security perspective. A detailed 
description of these can be found in Denis et al., but we also summarise them here. Firstly, SCADA 
is a key technology for Critical Infrastructures [11]. SCADA is a communication system that 
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supports a collection of data from sensors and sends them to a control centre for management 
purposes [52]. However, by introducing SCADA into a system, new concerns are also introduced 
in terms of security (This point will be explained in more detail later when we discuss the problems 
and challenges associated with Critical Infrastructure security). Secondly, the increasing 
importance of communication for Critical Infrastructure has seen the introduction of IP-based 
networks. Finally, an important factor is the introduction of the smart-grid, which has significant 
ramifications in terms of security. 
Although considerable effort has been expended on the protection of Critical Infrastructures, it 
remains an ongoing and persistent challenge [53]. For various reasons, this challenge is hard to 
tackle. A particular difficulty is that there is no way to fully understand the interdependencies 
between the various Critical Infrastructures [54]. Moreover, there is no single understanding of 
how the elements of Critical Infrastructure functionally affect one another [55]. Consequently, this 
fundamentally impacts on our ability to protect Critical Infrastructure systems, since one of the 
key aims is to determine and manage these elements during an attack. 
Another challenge that Critical Infrastructures face is the protection of the underlying SCADA 
systems [56]. As discussed previously, SCADA is a system that monitors and controls Critical 
Infrastructure operations, such as power, water, etc. SCADA includes two main elements: the 
Master Terminal Unit (MTU) and the Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). The MTU  acts as the brain 
of the system and the RTUs collect data locally and send it to the MTU [57]. Coutinho, et al., 
define two approaches to having a more secure and protected SCADA system. The first approach 
is to spot the problems that can affect the parameters in the system by using antivirus and intrusion-
detection systems. The second approach is to check the data flow and the system within periods of 
normal behaviour and try to detect any difference or change within the SCADA system [58]. 
39 
 
Moreover, increasing numbers of connections to SCADA systems, such as office networks and 
the Internet, makes them more vulnerable to conventional cyber-attacks [59]. 
 Interdependency 
Critical Infrastructure types vary from one country to another [60]. However, there is one aspect 
in common; infrastructures have become highly interdependent. This is due to the increase in 
demand for the amenities provided. This has led to an increased interdependence between their 
underlying physical layers; in which a failure can be cascaded and affect the rest of the domain. 
One infrastructure’s provision relies heavily on another. Due to this increased connectivity Critical 
Infrastructures face a number of possible digital threats [61]. 
The Internet is heavily relied upon by the Critical Infrastructure. This has led to different security 
threats facing interconnected security systems [62]. By understanding the interconnectivity 
behaviour between Critical Infrastructures, and how it changes depending on the complexity, can 
help in reducing the effect before cascading occurs. This would control the damage and limit the 
impact [63]. Taking into account that every new interdependency reveals a fresh vulnerability in 
the system of systems, which creates new cyber-attack risks [49]. 
Considerable effort has been expended on the protection of Critical Infrastructures; however it is 
an ongoing and persistent challenge. Various factors contribute to this, for example, there is a lack 
of understanding about the interdependency scheme within Critical Infrastructure groupings. 
Moreover, there is no single approach about how the elements of a Critical Infrastructure's 
functionality are affected by a connected partner. Rinaldi et al., for example, identify four groups 
to categorise infrastructure interconnectivities [6][5]. 
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Moreover, infrastructure interdependency can be viewed as a flow in networks. However, we 
cannot treat different Critical Infrastructure systems as an independent part, as it would limit our 
modelling methods. Four interdependency categories were identified by Rinaldi et al., where the 
infrastructure can be fitted into any of the following four types according to those categories [6] 
[5]: 
 Physical Interdependency: it can be said that two infrastructures are physically 
interdependent on each other if their output materials are linked. 
 Geographic Interdependency: it can be said that the infrastructures are geographically 
interdependent if an environmental factor can affect the infrastructure. 
 Logical Interdependency: it can be said that two infrastructures are logically interdependent 
on each other if their connection is through a specific mechanism, such as policies, 
regulation, etc. 
 Cyber Interdependency: it can be said that the infrastructures are cyber interdependent if 
the infrastructures depend on information transmitted through information systems. 
SCADA is one example of a communication system that could cause cyber 
interdependency. 
With many systems, this interdependency raises several problems for Critical Infrastructures, 
especially with the analysis or modelling of the infrastructure. Some of these factors, which could 
affect the interdependencies, were indicated by Rinaldi et al., such as timescales, geographic 
scales, cascading and higher order effects, social/psychological elements, operational procedures 
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business policies, restoration and recovery procedures, government regulatory, legal, policy 
regimes and finally stakeholder concerns [6]. These factors are critical and can have a negative 
impact on the system. Therefore, it is essential to understand some of the different modelling 
methods used in order to discover infrastructure interdependency [64]. 
One of the important pieces of evidence that has shown the interrelationship cascading possibility 
between infrastructures, was in 2001 when a chemical freight train derailed in Baltimore’s Howard 
Street Tunnel [65]. Significant unexpected failures were found in different infrastructures, such as 
water, electricity and telecommunication systems.  
2.3.1 Interconnectivity Modelling  
Modelling individual infrastructures is a well-researched area, however, modelling of multiple 
interdependent infrastructures is still at an immature phase [6], [65]. However, the incidents of 
both natural disasters and cyber-attacks have proven that it is possible to measure the effect across 
infrastructures and find relationships through different interdependency modelling practices [66].  
Rinaldi et al., grouped interdependency models into six different broad categories ranging from 
highly aggregated tools to very detailed, high-resolution and high-fidelity models [6]. The first 
category is the aggregate supply and demand tools category, which evaluates the total demand for 
infrastructure services in a region and the ability to supply those services. The second category is 
the dynamic simulation category, which can be used to examine a Critical Infrastructure's 
operations, the effects of disruptions and the associated downstream consequences.  
In addition, dynamic simulation can be used to examine the effects of law, policies and regulations 
upon the operation of a Critical Infrastructure. The third category is that of agent-based models, 
which are used in a wide spectrum of interdependency and infrastructure analyses. The fourth 
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category is the physical-based model category where physical aspects of infrastructures can be 
analysed with some standard engineering techniques. This category of modelling can produce 
highly detailed information on the operational state of infrastructures, even down to the level of 
individual components. The fifth category covers population mobility models, which examine the 
movement of entities through urban regions as entities interact with each other. The sixth category 
is the Leontief input-output model category, which can be applied to infrastructure studies. This 
model provides a linear, aggregated, time-independent analysis of the generation, flow and 
consumption of various commodities among infrastructure sectors [6]. 
As an example of the modelling and simulation method, Di Giorgio et al., use a Dynamic Bayesian 
Network (DBN) as a novel technique for modelling Critical Infrastructure interdependency [67]. 
The DBN is divided into three levels. The atomic events level is concerned with using random 
variables that are linked to some unpleasant events reflecting on the Critical Infrastructure. The 
propagation level then constructs the frame of the interdependency in the Critical Infrastructure 
and their services. Finally, the services show the final Critical Infrastructure interest depending on 
the people working in Critical Infrastructure. However, Di Giorgio et al., faced some limitations 
particularly by using a specific discrete random variable and by limiting their failure types [67]. It 
has been considered that developing a new modelling method for the Critical Infrastructure 
interdependency is a challenge. 
A second example is Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM). According to Han et al., the ISM 
methodology can analyse the interactions of several Critical Infrastructures according to their 
mutual influence within a complex system [68]. Han et al., applied ISM in their research on a 
system of eight infrastructures to develop a framework that shows interrelationships of Critical 
Infrastructures and classifies the different infrastructures’ criticality according to their dependence 
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and power. Relationships that can be used to lead the whole system to be a more efficient 
infrastructure system were found as a result. However, these methods only show the relationship 
between the different systems involved.  
By using both modelling and Critical Infrastructure interdependency simulation methods for data 
construction, to find the relationship between different Critical Infrastructure systems, this research 
aims to be able to reduce the impact of the cascading failure occurring to other infrastructures.  
 Cyber- Attacks  
Companies around the world are investing possible solutions for their cyber-security concern, in 
order to protect their position and financial situation. CIP has become a prominent topic that can 
help in addressing cyber security threats [69]. This section presents, in depth, the cyber-threats 
facing Critical Infrastructures. 
2.4.1   Cyber-Attacks and Critical Infrastructures   
A significant number of Critical Infrastructures rely on the Internet.  As a result, a number of 
security challenges have emerged, such as cyber-attacks and malicious activities [70]. Hence, 
cyber-attacks have become an important topic for researchers, military operations and businesses 
[71]. 
Various complex attacks are devoted to targeted Critical Infrastructures. On the whole, Critical 
Infrastructures have weak security systems and can be at risk of losing sensitive information, or 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks [70]. Chen et al., for example, indicate that there was a 17-fold increase 
from 2009 to 2011 of cyber-attacks in the USA on the power grid infrastructure [72].  
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Abuzahkar et al., point out three cyber risks. These are: cyber-crime (managed by individuals or 
groups for extracting valuable information), cyber-war (this is usually conducted by nation states 
to steal valuable information or cause disruption) and cyber terror (this is managed by either an 
individual or organization working for a national state or for their own political views) [70]. In a 
successful cyber-attack scenario, the outcomes may compromise either the actual physical IT 
system itself or result in the loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of an IT system [73]. 
Command et al., demonstrate several of the cyber tools that can be used in order to conduct their 
needs, which are listed as follows [15]: 
 Backdoor  Denial of Service  Spoofing 
 Keylogger  Logic bomb  Sniffer 
 Physical Attacks  Trojan Horse  Viruses 
 Worms  Zombie  
2.4.2 Infrastructures Security Threats   
To date, successful cyber-attacks have either destroyed, manipulated information or deactivated 
stations [74]. One of these examples has been indicated by Wanger et al., when a cyber-attacker 
managed to control and shut down the Prykarpattyaoblenergo Control Center (PCC) in the Ivano-
Frankivsk region of Western Ukraine, which rendered more than 230,000 homes without 
electricity for up to six hours. This intrusion was one of the first strongly and well-organised 
attacks that happened against a nation’s power grid [75]. 
Now taking the German nuclear power plant cyber-attack as an example, two viruses W32.Ramnit 
and Conficker were injected into PCs in the nuclear site. The viruses did not accomplish their 
target since the station was not connected to the Internet. These viruses were modelled in order to 
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snip and capture files from infected machines. Moreover, these viruses gave the ability to the 
attacker to control the system remotely with an internet connection [76] [77]. 
The smart grid is considered to be one of the most vulnerable sectors. Four common types of cyber-
attacks can be found within the smart grid infrastructure [78]. Firstly, device attack, this attack 
usually starts at the initial step of an attack and focuses on controlling a grid device. Secondly, a 
data attack which is usually concerned within network traffic, manipulates data in order to alter 
decisions and results. Thirdly, a privacy attack which focuses on revealing private information 
from the electricity usage data. Finally, a network availability attack, which aims to delay or 
disable the communications in the smart grid by overloading the control centre with false 
information [79] [80].  
All these examples show how vulnerable Critical Infrastructures are and how important it is to 
increase the level of security.  
 Summary 
Critical Infrastructure assets contribute to the economy and society as a whole. Their impact on 
the security, economy and health sector are extremely vital. However, their increasing complexity 
has led to the creation of direct and indirect interdependent connections amongst the infrastructure 
groupings. This has resulted in different security threats facing interconnected security systems. 
By understanding the complexity of Critical Infrastructure interdependency, and how to take 
advantage of it in order to minimize the cascading problem, enables the prediction of potential 
problems before they happen.  
Cyber-attacks are a major threat to the network. Critical Infrastructures will always be a significant 
target for cyber-attacks, as long as the Internet and the technology needed is available. Yet, cyber 
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security levels could improve if more communication and collaboration were found between the 
operator in private and public spheres. Shared information can limit the impact, help understand 
the threats and eradicate vulnerabilities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1 Introduction  
The observation of physical data approaches towards Critical Infrastructures security focus on 
using network data. However, our system uses an observer pattern that recognizes threats and 
security breaches using behavioural observation and big data analytics.  
Therefore, this chapter is a critical analysis of published sources. The chapter is formed to provide 
information about different facets that underpin Critical Infrastructures. These areas include big 
data and the use of analytics for predictive, descriptive, diagnosis and prescriptive analysis. Next, 
the chapter describes the publish-subscribe design pattern. Finally, a review of the machine 
learning is presented.  
3.2 Big data  
Over the past two decades, big data has become increasingly important in both the academic and 
the business communities [81]. In addition, big data has highlighted the need for infrastructures 
and tools to capture, store, analyse and use various amounts of structured and unstructured data 
[82]. The amount of data that passes through the internet represents a huge challenge for software 
developers and infrastructure companies in terms of how to operate, function and analyse this 
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volume of data, keeping in mind, this data needs to be securely delivered [83]. Therefore, 
companies have given invested considerable time to big data and the big data analytics in order to 
define data sets and discover the inherent patterns and anomalies that reside within it [82].  
In order to cover the important points regarding big data, this section is divided into three 
subsections, starting with a brief discussion on big data and its associated characteristics. This is 
followed by a discussion on the challenges that face big data. Finally, a discussion on the four 
different analytic types is discussed.             
3.2.1 Brief of Big data 
Companies nowadays use big data to understand customer’s behaviour and preferences. Big data 
is the next generation of computing that creates value through data scanning and analysis. Over 
time, data produced by users has grown exponentially for several reasons, including procurement 
data in supermarkets, commercial markets, banks, health and social networks. However, 
companies need to handle large volumes of data to control overload and noise. A number of 
definitions can be found to define big data. Jagannathan define big data as sets of large or complex 
structured and unstructured data that is collected from various sources [82]. In addition, Mishra 
define big data as a large amount of data that needs new technologies and architectures in order to 
extract value from it [84]. Large data consists of structured information, which accounts for 10% 
of the total amount of data available compared with the unstructured information that constitutes 
the rest [83]. Big data has penetrated into many communities, such as health infrastructures, 
governments infrastructures, and smart power grids [81]. Amazon is another example which 
computes millions of background processes every day and relies heavily on Linux systems to 
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handle the huge amounts of data generated from online orders. In addition, Facebook processes 50 
billion user generated pictures [85].      
Tole presented big data characteristics as the “3V’s model”, volume, velocity and variety. Volume 
refers to the throughput of data, velocity as the speed and frequency of data and variety as the 
different types of data and associated complexity [83]. However, Swapnil et al., added two 
additional “V’ models”, which are: veracity which refers to the quality of the capture data and 
value described as the quality of stored data [86]. Figure 1 illustrates the multi V models.   
 
Figure 1 The Big Data Characteristics Models 
3.2.2 Big Data and Analytics  
Companies think that having data allows them to develop profitable results. The secret does not 
lie in data collection but in the relevant data you're using. Therefore, it is essential to determine 
the quality of data you need to compile in order to achieve a successful trade. Big data analytics is 
a method that helps organizations with decisions using large dataset to reveal hidden patterns, 
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anonymous correlations, statistical trends, customer behaviour and information that is valuable 
[87].    
The analytics of large data seeks to improve decision-making and review data management 
decisions. Large companies use big data analytics system to improve the internal processes, such 
as risk management, improve existing products and services or to develop new products and 
service offerings [88]. Therefore, the benefit of big data analytics allows new opportunities to be 
uncovered. Big data analytics also helps to improve business decision making and helps to avoid 
crimes [87], [89]. 
Understanding the different types of big data analytics methods helps data scientists work 
effectively with their data. Therefore, four types of big data analytics are indicated by Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2 Analytic Types 
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Moreover, Pyne et al., and EMC describes these analytics types in depth [90], [91]: 
 Descriptive: this method is the simplest class of analytics. This technique assists in 
understanding what happened historically and how this might affect future results. An 
example of descriptive analytics is credit risk and sales cycle. 
 Diagnostic: this technique investigates why something has happened. In another word, this 
analytics method will discover the root-cause of the problem and isolate all confounding 
information. Moreover, the diagnostic technique focuses on the relationships and orders in 
the systems. An example of diagnostic analytics is a customer’s health score   
 Predictive: this technique helps in shaping the next step by answering, “What is likely to 
happen”. This method depends on finding a correlation between variables, such as the age 
and heart attack risk. Keeping in mind that this technique uses historical data in order to 
illustrate the trends and patterns by using statistical models.   
 Prescriptive: The purpose of this method is to make the best decision from the data adding 
some recommendation on why and how to make it happen. There are two approaches in 
order to present this technique: simulation and optimization. 
Both descriptive and diagnostic analytics focus on the past and are used to summarize what 
happened while predictive and prescriptive deal with the future and summarize what can happen 
and how to make it happen [92]. 
There is a difference between analytics and analysis, the first is concerned with prediction and 
recommendation. While analysis is simply based on mathematical analysis [89].      
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3.3 Communication Patterns 
This section presents an example of a communication pattern that has been adapted for the 
framework proposed in this Thesis, the Publish-Subscribe design pattern. 
Publish-Subscribe is a method were the publisher aggregates the message to classes without the 
knowing who the subscribers are. Subscribers receive message events without knowledge of 
publishers. The objective of this system is to let information propagate from the publisher to the 
subscriber in an anonymous fashion. This type of message pattern offers great network scalability. 
Depending on the meta-data, publishers and subscribers share information cached locally. The 
publish-subscribe design pattern consists of three parts:  
 Publisher: A publisher is an entity that creates notification messages based on situations. 
They provide information by creating a stream of messages that contain a header and a 
payload.  
 Subscriber: A subscriber is an entity that receives notification messages from a notification 
producer. Subscribers are usually interesting in events.   
 Message broker or event bus, is an entity that is responsible for registering to receive events 
from publishers and deliver events to subscribers. The event bus act as a temporary store.   
This technique has the advantage of loose coupling, which allows the publisher and subscriber to 
discover and communicate with each other. Scalability in this thesis is one of the research 
challenges. Using the publish-subscribe pattern solves this. The design does not have an inherent 
impact on code performance. However, the publish-subscribe pattern does face delivery issues in 
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terms of time. Event loops can occur when there are many events published and subscribed to, and 
this can freeze the system. Figure 3 and 4 describe the process of the publish-subscribe pattern and 
how it has been adapted within our framework for communication. 
 
Figure 3 Publisher-Subscriber Pattern Process 
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Figure 4 Adapted Pattern used in the Proposed Framework in this Thesis for Communication 
Processes 
 
The figures shows the difference between the publish-subscribe communication pattern and the 
process for system communication used by the proposed framework in this thesis.  
3.4 Simulation  
Simulation has become an essential and useful part of mathematical modelling for many natural 
systems in physics, astrophysics, chemistry, biology, economics, psychology, social sciences and 
new technology architectures [93]. Simulation is an imitation process of real circumstances, which 
generally include some physical behaviours of systems, [94]. In recent years, the interest in 
simulation has increased for the purposes of education and experimentation. Typically, it involves 
the process of concepts, activities or experiments conducted through the computer [95]. Al-essa et 
al., define simulation as a method for teaching students that brings elements from the real world; 
overriding difficulties, such as, material cost or human resources [96].  
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Currently, there are various existing simulation programs, which contain ‘smart’ built-in models 
for many common real systems. These programs help to analyse the inputs and outputs and do all 
the ‘hard’ work required and give effective and comprehensive results.  
Critical Infrastructure experimentation would ordinarily require the purchase of off-the-shelf 
hardware, which is extremely expensive and impractical for the average researcher [97]. This has 
led to the development of specific software-based simulators, such as Tecnomatix [98], and the 
adaptation of existing software-based simulators such as OMNET++, Simulink and Matlab [99]. 
These software simulators allow for affordable representations of critical systems, by modelling 
their behaviour, interactions and the integration of their specific protocols such as Modbus [100]. 
Generally, simulation can be divided into four types as Al-esaa et al., present [96]: 
 Physical Simulation - This type of simulation uses the physical material to represent a 
testbed. This could be, for example, a flight simulator used for training pilots.  
 Procedural Simulation - This type of simulation is designed to teach users a series of acts 
or steps; such as training on the steps to run a machine or device, or diagnosis of certain 
diseases in medicine. It allows people to train in a realistic environment without a real-
world impact. 
 Situational Simulation - This type differs from the procedural simulation, where the role of 
the learner is to discover the positions of appropriate responses by repeating the simulation. 
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 Process Simulation - This type of simulation helps to simulate the difficult movements, for 
example, detailed experiments, such as the movement of electrons. Therefore, the process 
of simulation can make it easier to grasp such concepts [101]. 
For simplicity, Al-esaa et al., divides the above four types into two main categories; either an 
educational simulation, through a hands-on experience, or through a visual demonstration by 
watching someone else [102].  
Modelling and examining the interdependencies between Critical Infrastructures is considered to 
be a new essential field. Therefore, a significant amount of research is conducted into developing 
and modelling the Critical Infrastructure behaviour [103]. This is used by companies, government 
and communities in order to improve the performance of the traffic flow, manage the expenses, 
improve the reaction to emergencies [104]. In the following section, a discussion is presented on 
the benefits of simulation.  
3.5 Why Simulation 
The power grid was established long before the cyber-threat appeared. Although physical attacks 
are serious threats, cyber-attacks, nowadays, present a greater threat. Hence, current connected 
systems have a huge task to ensure that every individual component is checked and monitored 
[105]. 
Nearly all the European Union (EU) Member States have recognised the challenges of CIP and 
have advanced measures now in place [68]. Yet, it is still an ongoing and persistent challenge. 
Various factors contribute to this, for example, there is a lack of understanding about the 
interdependency scheme within Critical Infrastructure groupings. Moreover, there is no single 
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approach about how the elements of a Critical Infrastructure’s functionality affect a connected 
partner [106], [102].  
With many system types, this raises several problems; particularly with the analysing or modelling 
of infrastructure networks, which are relied on by multiple Critical Infrastructures. Some of these 
factors, which could affect interdependencies, are indicated by Rinaldi et al., [106]. They can 
include elements, such as timescales, geographic scales, cascading and higher order effects, 
social/psychological elements, operational procedures business policies, restoration and recovery 
procedures, government regulatory, legal, policy regimes and finally stakeholder concerns. These 
factors are critical and can have a detrimental impact on the system. 
As previously discussed, most Critical Infrastructures are controlled by SCADA, which is one of 
the infrastructure challenges that make it vulnerable to cyber-attacks [107]. Linking the SCADA 
network to business networks has increased threats, such as malware, insider, hacker and terrorism 
[108]. SCADA attack consequences are particularly serious, affect the public and cause a financial 
crisis. An example of this was seen in the Aurora Generator Test, carried out at the Idaho National 
Laboratory in 2007, which cost the US $1 million dollars by simulating a remote cyber-attack on 
a generator control station [109]. 
Therefore, simulation has a key role in the advancement of CIP. Its use is becoming a common 
technique for the testing of cyber-attack prevention measures and for improving the level of 
security techniques [110]. A simple system can be created to represent a larger infrastructure and 
allow for realistic testing to take place. It is clear that there are many benefits of using simulation. 
It helps in conducting experimentation on a realistic representation of a system, without the worry 
that any damage that was done would have a real impact [111]. In particular, when testing against 
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cyber-attack resilience and developing new approaches to security, Critical Infrastructure 
simulation is of great benefit [40].  
Ündeger et al., further discuss that modelling and simulation offer time-efficiency [41]. This is 
particularly beneficial for understanding phenomenon-based disasters and exploring the impact of 
new policies, without testing it in the real world. Ündeger et al., recognise that using simulation 
approaches to model interdependency within a complex system can answer the major ‘what-if’ 
questions within a  safe environment [112].  
To date, simulations have helped in developing and enhancing new framework concepts to 
improve security levels. For example, NIST developed a simulation framework to reduce the risk 
of cyber-attacks to Critical Infrastructures [113]. The NIST framework includes sets of procedures 
and methodologies that help to understand the cyber risks. Moreover, the approach involves 
flexible, classified, performance-based and cost-effective methods with more security measures. 
Specifically, the NIST cyber-security framework has been set up to strengthen security through 
the following: 
 Diagnose the security status of a system. 
 Mend and form a cyber-security program.  
 Detect new chances for new or known standards. 
 Support Critical Infrastructure organisation, to use a cyber-security framework with tools 
and technologies [42].  
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As such, Critical Infrastructures have benefited from the NIST cyber-security framework. This has 
been recognised by some notable improvements, such as reducing the time of starting the security 
program, recognising the improving areas in the program and improving the efficiency with law 
communication between Critical Infrastructures [113].  
As discussed, simulation can be employed to help manage the understanding of interdependency 
between Critical Infrastructures. As such, the next sub-section presents the different modelling 
work that has been undertaken in order improve the level of security currently in place. 
3.6 Critical Infrastructures Modelling 
Several works have investigated cascading failures in Critical Infrastructures, and subsequent 
models that can be used to help simulate the impacts of failure to improve the level of security. 
Therefore, this section presents a number of modelling and simulation examples. 
Table 2 and 3 present a summary of the different models that were used in order to enhance the 
impact caused by cascading failures in Critical Infrastructures. Laprie et al., for example, choose 
electricity and the associated information infrastructures because of the massive growth in their 
interdependency, which raises the vulnerability that can occur from the cascading and increased 
risk of large scale blackouts from the electricity transmission system. Laprie et al., used a 
qualitative model focused on the main failures that happened from interdependency such as, 
cascading and expanding [114].  
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Table 2: Summary of Studies on Infrastructure Modelling and Simulation Examples 
Authors Description Critical 
Infrastructu
re 
Findings/ Outcomes Limitation /Gaps Our Model 
(CIAIRS) 
Haimes 
et al.,  
Develop a 
methodology that 
administrates the risk 
of cyber-attacks on 
interdependent 
infrastructures 
especially that target 
the production, 
filtering and 
supplying. The 
problem in this 
system is that it is 
highly 
interconnected and 
interdependent with 
the inner system, the 
external 
infrastructures 
system and the 
financial sector. 
Oil & Gas Develop a better 
understanding of the 
probability of the cyber-
attack on the measures, 
infrastructure and economic 
level.          Indicate the level 
of risk that can be posed to 
SCADA from the 
infrastructure 
interdependency. 
Recommendations for 
managing cyber-attacks in 
interdependency 
infrastructures  
 According to the massive 
system area that accrues a 
problem in the modelling 
dimension.  
 As a result of the limitation 
in money, the model needed 
a risk identification phase to 
structure the critical 
scenarios.  
 The system needs to be built 
on existing models and 
analyses  
Built on existing 
models and data 
that helped in 
building a correct 
form.      
Byres et 
al.,  
The model that was 
used focused on the 
communication in 
SCADA, based on 
Modbus protocol. 
The methodology 
was created 
depending on the 
SCADA 
communicati
on  
Indicates a number of 
features for 11 attacker 
goals, such as the attacks 
goals, the level of the attack 
difficulty on SCADA, the 
impact and the likelihood of 
these attacks and the 
probability of spotting the 
Did not consider the attacks 
from: other interdependency 
points, SCADA communication 
by other infrastructures, the 
wireless connection and third 
parties policies 
Covered the 
interdependency 
between the 
infrastructures and 
studied the effect 
of this connection 
and how it can help 
in alarming the 
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possibilities and the 
interconnectivity 
between the attacks. 
11 attacker goals 
were used to improve 
the Modbus standard    
attacks. The attacker goals 
were mainly focusing on 
identifying the Modbus and 
gaining access to the 
network.   
other 
infrastructures 
Laprie 
et al., 
Present the failure 
related to two Critical 
Infrastructures from 
their 
interdependency by a 
qualitative 
modelling. The 
model was a 
qualitative structure 
depending on the 
behaviour of the 
interdependency 
between the two 
infrastructures 
Electricity 
and 
associated 
information 
Different models were 
found and refine the impact 
of the quantitative measures 
on the interdependency 
between the electricity and 
information infrastructures. 
Focusing on only two types of 
attack deceptive and perceptible 
attacks and isolate the impact of 
accidental faults from the 
malicious fault is considered as 
a limitation of this work that 
made the model non-integrated 
More attacks and 
more 
infrastructures 
taken into account 
in order to give a 
bigger picture of 
the effect of the 
interdependency 
within the 
infrastructures.   
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In another approach, researchers discussed the huge impact of blackouts on the economy caused 
by cascading failures, and how they use modelling to capture the dynamics of cascading failures 
and blackouts in electricity power systems [115] [116]. Dobson et al., discuss the CASCADE 
model, which focuses on the critical point and the stage where the cascade failure is likely to 
happen [117]. Finally, complex network theory is used to model cascading failures in 
infrastructures. This method depends on analysing the structure and flexibility of the network and 
removes accidental failures or attacks [118]. Therefore, Kinney et. al., use the Crucitti-Latora-
Marchiori (CLM) model as one of the complex network models based on a dynamic approach 
[119]. Next Chassin et. al., employ the Barabási-Albert network model ‘apple’ to generate scale-
free networks using connected nodes that use the power-law connectivity probability [120]. 
The above models used complex network theory to model the cascading failures in electricity 
infrastructures to consider what will affect the system and direct the system to breakdown. 
However, researchers have used models that have not considered the complexity of the relation 
and the interdependency between the electricity infrastructure and information communications 
infrastructures. Finally, it is clear that the modelling did not cover well-known failures, such as 
escalating failures.  
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Table 3: Summary of Studies on Infrastructure Modelling and Simulation Examples 
Authors Description Critical 
Infrastructure 
Findings/ Outcomes Limitation /Gaps 
Dobson and 
Carreras  
Probabilistic model 
created to spot the 
cascade in a system 
and clone new 
features to understand 
the failures from the 
blackout and 
cascading failures. 
Use the critical point 
in order to  estimate 
the probability of 
cascade failures 
electricity 
power  
By shaping the model and 
operating it to reach the 
critical point where the 
system becomes in risk of 
cascade failure the blackout 
risk ranked between small, 
medium and high 
It was hard to balance 
between the cost and limiting 
throughput in the system from 
a costly common cascading 
failure and management of 
blackout risk 
Kinney et. al., Present the grid as an 
undirected graph and 
analyse features from 
the system flow as 
internet traffic and 
power flow. CLM 
present the power grid 
as nodes, generator, 
loads and connective 
edge presenting the 
transmitted lines 
power grid Helped in studying the power 
system characteristic at a 
comprehensive scale and 
assist the level of cascading 
within different network 
topology 
CLM can face some limitation 
of measuring the blackout size  
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Chassin and 
Posee  
Have analysed the 
reliability of North 
American eastern and 
western electric grids 
by using the complex 
networks model the 
Barabási-Albert 
network model to 
improve the grid 
flexibility. Two 
failures were 
identified that helped 
in cascading failure in 
the electricity grid: 
edge removal and 
node removal 
power grid Indicate that the relation 
between the node and the 
interconnected very efficient 
to indicate the behaviour in 
the scale-free systems. 
Produce a model indicating 
the cascade failures in two 
electricity grids by knowing 
both the physical and the 
policies in the system. 
merging the probability 
connection for the scale-free 
network to evaluate the 
reliability for the two energy 
infrastructures 
The model used only two 
reliability models, which 
made the result of the eastern 
and western electricity grid 
not efficient. 
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3.7 Machine Learning  
Machine learning allows computers to learn and discover insights in data without being 
programmed to do so. Machine learning improves computer functionality when exposed to new 
data and uses previous computation in order to produce dependable, repeatable conclusions and 
results. Various field use machine learning to recognize the data they have, such as financial 
services to prevent fraud, government utilities to reduce identity theft, and the oil and gas industries 
to improve oil distribution lines [121]. In machine learning, computers are not told how to solve a 
particular problem, instead algorithms are utilised to abstract meaning from data based on different 
learning models – supervised, unsupervised, semi-supervised and reinforcement. 
Figure 5 and 6 indicates these methods in a simple clear way. 
 
Figure 5 Machine Learning Algorithms by Learning Style 
Algorithms are grouped by learning style: supervised learning and unsupervised learning are the 
two main types. However, there are other methods, such as semi-supervised and reinforcement. 
The learning algorithms focus on the roles of the input data and the process of choosing the model 
in order to select the most suitable to reach the best outcome. In supervised-learning algorithms, 
Algorithms
Type of Learning
ML Machine Learning 
Supervised 
Classification Regression
ReinforcementSemi-
supervised
Un-
Supervised 
Clustring
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historical data (training dataset) is used to train models. Supervised machine learning algorithms 
predict the values of labelled data depending on patterns learned patters within the data [122]. In 
the case of unsupervised-learning algorithms, unlabeled data is utilsed to cluster data into different 
groupings to try and find structures. This is often referred to as cluster analysis. Semi-supervised 
machine-learning is a mixture of both supervised and unsupervised, which deals with labelled and 
unlabelled data sets [123]. The dataset in this technique use a small amount of labelled data with 
a large amount of unlabelled data [124]. In the case of reinforcement-learning, algorithms focus 
on balance examination of unknown data set with the use of current knowledge. This technique 
does not need correct input-output data sets - it only needs to learn good policy [121].    
 
Figure 6  Machine Learning Algorithms by Similarity 
3.7.1 Supervised  
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In this thesis, the evaluation uses supervised learning as illustrated in Figure 7. In this approach 
algorithms receive known input data called training data along with a known label output for each 
observation. This learning type provides a mapping function between input variables (x) and 
output variable (y). The goal is to predict output (y) from new input variable (x) [125]. Under 
supervised machine learning, there are two categories included: classification and regression. 
Classification is used when the output variable can be grouped into classes. An example of 
classification algorithms are support vector machines (SVM), neural networks, Naïve Bayes 
classifiers, decision trees, discriminant analysis, and k-nearest neighbour (kNN). Regression 
algorithms are used to predict a continuous value or a real output value. Common regression 
algorithm includes linear regression, nonlinear regression, generalized linear models, decision 
trees, and neural networks[122].   
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Figure 7 Supervised Machine Learning Techniques 
Figure 7 describes five supervised learning algorithms. The first algorithm is logical based that use 
decision trees as an example. The decision tree is a non-parametric algorithm that classifies data 
depending on the feature values. This type of algorithm consists of nodes and branches that handle 
missing values and interactions between features. Each node represents a feature and each branch 
represents a value. Although the decision tree provides high performance, it is hard to deal with 
high dimensional data. Moreover, one of the serious problem that face this algorithm is error 
propagation through trees. Next, the perceptron is a well-known algorithm capable of dealing with 
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non-linear or dynamic data. A perceptron is the simplest form of Neural Network (NN) that is used 
to classify linearly separable data [126]. 
Bayesian Network classifiers, unlike NNs, take less computational time to train and there is no 
need for hyper parameter tuning. However, the size of the data can affect performance in Bayesian 
classifiers. Another algorithm that is considered a lazy-learning algorithm is the nearest neighbour 
algorithm (kNN), which is a non-parametric method. The algorithm is based on a distance function. 
kNN takes less time to train but more time during classification. The algorithm has a number of 
disadvantages, such as large storage requirements [127].  
Finally, the support vector machine (SVM) algorithm finds the best hyperplane to separate data 
classes from each other using the largest margin. It makes a simple linear separation between 
classes. This algorithm offers high accuracy and performance is not effected by the size of the 
features. However, the complexity and the choice of tuning parameters can affect the performance 
[121].   
Several considerations need to be made when choosing appropriate learning algorithms, such as 
memory usage, prediction rapidity and the model explanation. In addition, the predictor level is 
important to take in count whether continuous or categorical results are required [85]. The 
evaluation for any classifier depends on prediction accuracy. There are two techniques to calculate 
the accuracy of classifiers: the first technique is by splitting the training data and use two-thirds 
for training and the rest for estimating performance. Cross-validation is the other technique, which 
works by dividing the training set into mutually exclusive and equal size subsets. The classifiers 
estimate of error depends on calculating the error rate of each subset [122].     
3.8 Summary  
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This chapter presented literature on big data and different analytics types: descriptive, diagnostic, 
predictive and prescriptive. Moreover, a brief description on classification approaches, was 
provided, grouped by supervised and the unsupervised learning algorithms. After understanding 
the strength and limitation of each method, few algorithms will be used to solve the problems 
investigated in this thesis. 
Effective security is costly, especially as Critical Infrastructures often require security systems to 
be tailored to match their unique needs. Simulation can play a huge role in filling this gap. Different 
modelling examples can be found to show how modelling helped in raising the level of security 
by understanding cyber-attacks. 
Table 4 indicates the different models, which the authors have used in order to simulate and model 
Critical Infrastructures. Haimes et. al., for example, explain the use of the Hierarchical 
Holographic Model (HHM) and how it can assists to resolve the extensive system into a hierarchy 
of subsystems that give an overview of the system from different angles and capture the 
interdependency within the Critical Infrastructures [128][129]. The HHM was established to solve 
the problem of the single model ability and demonstrate each part of the system as individual 
subsystems to analyses the interaction between each other. Therefore, a number of points need to 
be available from the system as the role, activities, political restrictions and the structures of the 
system [130]. In another example, Byres et. al., focus on using the tree methodology in order to 
model the cyber-attacks. The attack tree assists in spotting the damage to SCADA systems by 
identifying the flaws, produces a special test from measurable goals that can be matched to real 
world devices, networks and implemented. Moreover, the tree applied at multiple layers 
considering other interruption [131].  
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Table 4: Summary of Author’s Different Models and Simulation Examples 
Authors Case 
Study 
Simulation System HHM Tree Qualitative 
Structure 
Complex 
Network 
Theory 
Haimes et 
al.,  
√ √ 
 
√ 
   
Byres et al.,  
 
√ 
  
√ 
  
Laprie et al., 
 
√ 
   
√ 
 
Dobson and 
Carreras  
 
√ CASCADE 
    
Kinney et 
al., 
 
√ CLM 
   
√ 
Chassin and 
Posee  
 
√ Barabási-
Albert 
network 
   
√ 
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CHAPTER 4 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
AUTOMATED IMMUNO-RESPONSE 
SYSTEM (CIAIRS) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
By understanding the complexity of Critical Infrastructure interdependencies, potential problems 
can be predicted before they happen and cascade throughout the network. The system proposed in 
this thesis is able to detect cyber-attacks, share the knowledge with interconnected partners and 
communicate the potential impact by creating an immune system network. Our work developed a 
system called Critical Infrastructure Auto-Immune Response System (CIAIRS), which assists and 
guides Critical Infrastructures on how to behave when abnormal behaviour is detected. Anomalous 
behaviour is then shared with other infrastructures and has been inspired by the human immune 
system characteristic [132].  
This chapter begins by; identify specific requirements that are important in designing the CIAIRS 
framework. Next, a number of real-life scenarios are highlighted in order to identify the system 
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requirements. This is followed by the CIAIRS structure along with a detailed account of the various 
components that work together to predict abnormal behaviours and share decisions with other 
infrastructures. Finally, the functioning of the system is detailed.  
4.2 CIAIRS System   
CIAIRS functionality relies on identifying attacks and guiding Critical Infrastructure operators on 
how to behave when abnormal behaviour is detected. Furthermore, inspired by the human immune 
system characteristic, the information is then shared with other infrastructures to create an artificial 
immune system network [132]. The quality of a framework depends on four main features: 
Simplicity, Clarity, Boundaries and Expandability [133]. Therefore, these features were taken in 
account when forming the research approach. 
4.2.1 CIAIRS Framework Requirements  
This stage identifies a number of requirements, which helped in designing the CIAIRS framework.  
The requirements of the system are defined as follow:       
 The CIAIRS framework has to be flexible and have the capability to add new features. 
Therefore, the system should act as a plug-in service 
 The CIAIRS framework has to collect data for analysis and reporting. In addition, 
transforming and merging data functions are required.  
 The new system has to be scalable and adaptable to different Critical Infrastructures. 
 The new framework has to learn system behaviour. 
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 The system needs to identify system anomalies  
 The new framework has to identify the interdependency between Critical Infrastructures. 
 Depending on interconnectivity registration, the system has to share the results of abnormal 
behaviour with the rest of the Critical Infrastructures 
 The system needs to use an operator to check the system activity    
 The system can save responses from different Critical Infrastructures about abnormal 
behaviour.  
4.2.2 CIAIRS Location 
Depending on the type of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) that monitors and controls the industrial 
infrastructure, the location of CIAIRS resides between the network layer and the enterprise layer 
[134]. CIAIRS is a comprehensive plug-in superintendent package for collecting and sharing 
abnormal behaviour with the rest of the Critical Infrastructures. In other words, the CIAIRS is a 
connecting software component in the network that collects data. Consequently, from a security 
point of view, if the CIAIRS was breached or attacked, this will not affect the rest of the 
infrastructure, since an operator is responsible for making the final decision before sending the 
information to the rest of the Critical Infrastructures, as shown in Figure 17. In order to picture the 
CIAIRS location, the ICS layers will be presented then the CIAIRS location. The SCADA system 
includes four major features: the operator or human machine interface (HMI), master terminal unit 
(MTU), communications, and remote terminal unit (RTU). Figure 8 specifies the ICS layers and 
Figure 9 illustrates the CIAIRS position within the ICS layout and the Industrial Network (IN).  
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Figure 8 The Industrial Network Architecture 
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Figure 9 CIAIRS Location within the IN & the ICS layers 
A number of applications are executed by CIAIRS, such as the Distribute time stamp, which assists 
in viewing the behaviours in the system; and numerical distribution, which helps convert numerical 
data to scales, such as high and low. Statistical export sheets, present the effect of an attack more 
easily than data view. This data is made use of by the CIAIRS system. 
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4.3 Real Scenarios  
Four real situations are presented relating to a Water Critical Infrastructure located at the National 
Ministry of Water in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia [135]. These scenarios are listed as follows: 
 Displacement in the main water carrier line from the source, which moved three sub water 
lines and affects other parts of the infrastructure.  
 Hit the main water line distributor with a shovel while extending power cables. The damage 
appeared 10 days later.  
 Separation in a water domestic line by a motor car, which caused water to leak for three 
hours. 
  A contaminated water leak that occurred in the main water line which stopped the water 
pump and suction for the contaminated water.   
The way to handle these scenarios was different depending on the amount of the damage in the 
water line, the equipment availability, the laboratory analysis results and the damage to other 
infrastructures. 
4.4 The CIAIRS Framework Construction  
Figure 10 illustrates the CIAIRS framework and the interaction between the various modules, 
which function together to perform the security and communication services. The modules linked 
together form the system as a whole, and work together in order to detect abnormal behaviours in 
one infrastructure and share them with others. The aim is to prevent cyber-attacks from having a 
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cascading impact and spreading to other infrastructures. Threat information is communicated to 
allow operators in other infrastructures to take appropriate measures to prevent an attack having 
an impact.  
 
Figure 10 CIAIRS Construction 
The whole process is clarified further in the next subsections, which detail the major key modules 
that comprise the CIAIRS system.  
4.4.1 Data Manager  
Within the Data Manager, the database holds different types of data as text, numbers and other 
readable forms. The data manager is responsible for directing the information collected from the 
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system to other modules. In addition, the data manager is responsible for all aspects of data 
processing, such as feature extraction, entry, validation, manipulation, backup, purifying and 
storage.  
Figure 11 presents a Data Flow Diagram for CIAIRS data processing of infrastructure data. A Data 
Acquisition (DAQ) unit is used to store data blocks to prevent system overloading. The data is 
either stored in the Critical Infrastructure DB or sent to the next step, for preparation and feature 
engineering. Each feature extracted takes time (T) and has data status (S). The status varies 
between sleep, repair, slow, overload, normal and cyber. These different statuses allow the system 
to realize the difference between normal and abnormal behaviour.     
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Figure 11 CIAIRS Data Manager 
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4.4.2 Data Preparation 
Real world data is often incomplete, noisy and inconsistent. Therefore, a data preparation process 
is important in order to clean, integrate, transform and reduce the data collected from the network. 
The data is passed through a cleaning process to make sure there is no missing information, reduce 
the noise in data and eliminate inconsistencies, such as duplication values; this stage is called the 
Data Preparation stage. Next, the data is normalized to ensure the values follow a specific range, 
usually between 0 and 1. Consequently, the data is split into multiple fragments to reduce the 
redundancy and to avoid data anomalies. By normalizing the data, the database is more suitable 
for querying. At this point, features are extracted analysed. The features correspond to the system 
behaviour and present a simplified view of the overall network. Figure 12 displays these stages.    
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Figure 12 CIAIRS Data Preparation 
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4.4.3 Data Analysis 
Using a feature set, classification used to model normal and the abnormal behaviour. Figures 13 
and 14 illustrate the main function of the CIAIRS analysis. Figure 13 illustrates the feature 
extraction process, which depends on the Critical Infrastructure type.    
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Figure 13 Feature Draw out 
The goal of using these features is to discover useful information in the data and simplify 
classification modelling processes.  
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By classifying the features, the data can be identified as either normal or abnormal system 
behaviour. Normal behaviour (Nb) would be when the infrastructure is functioning under correct 
parameters. Whereas abnormal behaviour (Ab), would be when the system is functioning 
incorrectly as a result of a cyber-attack taking place. The classification process enables CIAIRS to 
distinguish between the two types. Figure 14 specifies the CIAIRS classification process, using 
the features to classify normal and abnormal behaviour.  
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Figure 14 CIAIRS Classification 
4.4.4 Attack Pattern Recognition   
CIAIRS is not only able to detect abnormal behaviours in the system but, also based on the immune 
system concept, CIAIRS is able to recognise the behaviour of specific attack types. In order to do 
this, it employs a pattern recognition and comparison process. The recognition is derived from a 
database supervised by the operator.   
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4.4.5 Database  
Five different databases are used in the system in order to hold the following information: 
 The saved feature list 
 The pattern of the abnormal and normal behaviours 
 The ID for the different Critical Infrastructures in order to identify the interconnectivity 
 The CIAIRS shared information and the known attack pattern.  
Each of these databases uses SQL, which is a common database type employed in Critical 
Infrastructures.  
4.4.6 Interconnectivity 
Discovering the interdependency between the different Critical Infrastructures is considered one 
of the main features of this system. After identifying abnormal behaviour, and determining the 
attack type in one of the Critical Infrastructures, the attack information and characteristics are 
shared with interconnected partners in order to prevent cascading failures. In order to function 
correctly, a CIAIRS system would be needed in each partner’s network. The system starts by 
sending a copy list that includes the new abnormal behaviours. However, in order to send it, an 
interconnectivity check is needed. Therefore, a communication server is needed to hold the 
different Critical Infrastructures ID. Figure 15 presents the interconnectivity check process.  
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Figure 15 CIAIRS Interconnectivity Check Process 
Each Critical Infrastructure needs to register its ID in a dictionary server in order to recognise all 
interdependency connections. Figure 16 shows the interconnectivity registration registering 
process. 
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Figure 16 CIAIRS Interconnectivity Registration 
4.4.7 Communication  
Depending on the decision from the interconnectivity registration process, the network uses the 
connectivity between infrastructures to share the new abnormal behaviour with interconnected 
partners. This would assist other infrastructures in planning for an emerging attack or cascading 
impact – at all times an administrator overseas the system functionality. Figure 17 illustrates how 
the CIAIRS broadcasts events between the different Critical Infrastructures. Different information 
is sent from CIAIRS as charts, recommendations or patterns; signatures to alarm the rest of the 
Critical Infrastructures. In addition, CIAIRS communicates with the same plug-in system, which 
is presented in Figure 17. This step is dependent on the interconnectivity registration scheme. In 
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order to ensure a certain level of protection an operator is responsible for checking and auditing 
any information before sending it to other Critical Infrastructures.       
 
Figure 17 CIAIRS Broadcasting 
 
Figure 18 presents the communication process for sharing attack information between the different 
partners. This is one of the novelties of the design. This process is divided into three main stages: 
decision, inner-process and action.  
The first stage starts after identifying the interconnectivity between the systems. The sent script, 
which includes the abnormal behaviour information, ID and source are compared to the data source 
of each interconnected Critical Infrastructure. After that, an approval-sharing request is sent to the 
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Critical Infrastructure in order to continue the communication. Next, the inner-process stage starts 
by comparing the database source; an indicator selects the corresponding information cell and adds 
to the database. Based on the result, information about an anomaly is distributed, under 
authorization from the operator, in order to suggest the right reaction for any future attacks. Finally, 
an action response is sent to inform the connected Critical Infrastructure with the recommended 
actions to resist against the expected attack. This is known as the action stage. 
 
Figure 18 Communication Process 
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 Figure 19 presents the process flow of the communication between the attacked Critical 
Infrastructure and the rest of the partners.     
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Figure 19 CIAIRS Communication Scheme 
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4.4.8 Action    
Each Critical Infrastructure handles the attack depending on the policy that the system works 
under. The theoretical action scheme of handling any action is presented in Figure 20. The action 
towards any attack fits into two routs: the first rout focuses on updating the list, which the Critical 
Infrastructures have and sending it to the CIAIRS that belongs to the system. The second rout 
resends a notification for the main Critical Infrastructure, which has sent the attack notification in 
order to state the reaction toward this type of attack. However, the reaction can be similar or 
different. 
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Figure 20 CIAIRS Action Scheme 
4.5 Summary  
This chapter started by specifying the CIAIRS framework requirements. Next, it presented a full 
perspective regarding the CIAIRS system, from the framework, location and communication. 
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Moreover, one of the main aspects in this chapter is demonstrating how the novelties of CIAIRS 
are able to increase the security level between the Critical Infrastructures.  
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPLEMENTATION 
5.1 Introduction  
Using a semi-structured interview, a realistic example based on the Saudi Water Ministry in Jeddah 
was used to implement CIAIRS [135]. Realistic simulation is used to construct the data. The data 
is used to evaluate the system. In total, a simulation of eight Critical Infrastructures is presented 
for the data construction process. 
5.2 Simulation Architecture  
In order to evaluate CIAIRS, realistic Critical Infrastructure data is required. Therefore, eight 
Critical Infrastructures are constructed using Tecnomatix [41]. Implementing the simulation 
involved two main points: Setting up the interconnectivity at a high level, and constructing the 
mechanisms of each infrastructure down to a low level. Using this approach, granular datasets are 
constructed for the data analysis process [132]. Using this approach enables the collection of data 
from individual infrastructures, as individual systems, as well as from the system as a whole, which 
is a system of systems.  
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Within the simulation, failures can be introduced, which disrupt the service provision; but there is 
no single point of failure which can crash the simulation as a whole [136]. Therefore, this section 
illustrates the steps that helped in developing the eight Critical Infrastructures.  
5.2.1 Map Design  
The eight Critical Infrastructures presented in both Figure 21 and 22 are comprised of a 
Hydroelectricity plant, an Electricity Grid, a Water Distribution plant, a Sewage System, a Nuclear 
Power Plant, a Coal Power Plant, a Factory and a Housing complex. The selection of these Critical 
Infrastructures was made, as they are well-known infrastructures, present in most developed 
countries [137]–[139]. Two designs are chosen to present the simulation, as each of the designs 
display a different aspect. The perspective city map is shown in Figure 21, whereas the links 
between the Critical Infrastructures is illustrated by the top view scheme in Figure 22. The links 
are either pipes or cables. 
 
Figure 21 Perspective City Map for the 8 Critical Infrastructures 
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Figure 22 A Top View Scheme Illustrating the Links between the 8 Critical Infrastructures 
5.2.2 Tecnomatix 
The simulation is based on object-oriented modelling, where each component inserted is an 
individual object. Each can be adjusted and used to construct data. In order to generate simulation 
data, objects are created and inserted for each of the components, which together form the 
simulation environment. Figure 23 presents an overview of the global Critical Infrastructure 
system of systems, and the different supply chains, such as water pipes, electricity cables and 
sewage system. Each of the Critical Infrastructure systems is given a graphical icon to represent 
its function more clearly. They can be expanded within the simulation, to show the different 
objects, which comprise the system as a whole. The eight Critical Infrastructures are as follows: 
1. Electricity Grid  
94 
 
2. Water Distribution  
3. Factory 
4. Nuclear Power Station 
5. Coal Power System 
6. Hydroelectricity system  
7. Sewage System,  
8. The compound of Houses.  
 
Figure 23 Simulation Plant for the Links between the eight Critical Infrastructures 
 
The various arrangements, of the system functionality, is presented in the process flow in Figure 
24. 
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Figure 24 the Process Flow between the 8 Critical Infrastructures 
5.3 Electricity System  
In this subsection, the Electricity System is presented. An expanded view of the system design, the 
actual simulation and the process flow are depicted. Figure 25 displays the expanded view of the 
Electricity system. The system is linked to three sources of material, which are required for it to 
function. They consist of the Hydroelectricity System, Coal System and Nuclear System. In turn, 
the Electricity System provides electricity to three others systems; Houses, Factories and Water. 
Moreover, the Electricity System consists of seven different components, which are displayed in 
Table 5.  
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Figure 25 Electricity System Components Diagram and location within the 8 Critical 
Infrastructures  
Table 5: Simulation Electricity Components 
Components 
1. Electricity cable from the 
hydroelectricity to the Smart Grid in 
the Grid 
2. Electricity cable from the Smart Grid 
to the Factory in the Grid 
3. Electricity cable from the Nuclear 
to the Smart Grid in the Grid 
4. Electricity cable from the Smart Grid 
to the Houses in the Grid 
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5. Electricity cable from the Coal to 
the Smart Grid in the Grid 
6. Electricity cable from the Smart Grid 
to the WD in the Grid 
7. the buffer in the Smart Grid 
Subsequently, Figure 26 displays the ‘inside’ of the Electricity Power Plant, particularly all the 
components which generate electricity.  
 
Figure 26 Simulation Plant for the Electricity System 
The Electricity functionality steps are illustrated in the process flow in Figure 27.  
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Figure 27 the Process Flow for the Electricity System 
5.4 Water System  
The next system is the water system, which is one of the main services that can have an impact on 
the housing infrastructure. Figure 28 displays the expand view of The Water Distribution System. 
The system links between the Electricity system and provides water to two other systems; the 
Houses and the Factory. Moreover, the Water System consists of 10 different components, 
presented in Table 6.  
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Figure 28 Water System Components Diagram and location within the 8 Critical Infrastructures 
Table 6: Simulation Water Components 
Components 
1. Electricity cable from the Smart 
Grid to the WD in the WD 
2. Water pipe 3 after the treatment in the 
WD  
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3. Water pipe 1 from the source in 
the WD 
4. WD Storage 
5. WD  Assembly 6. Water pipe 4 in the WD 
7. Water pipe 2 in the WD  8. Water pipe from WD to Houses in the 
WD 
9. WD treatment 10. Water pipe from WD to Factory in 
the WD 
 
Figure 29 illustrates the components within the Water Distribution System. The Water Distribution 
System consists of a main water resource, the sea, a main electricity cable from the power plant 
and a transport system to send the water through pipes and feed both the houses in the compound 
and a factory. The Water Distribution System is controlled by a FlowControl to pump the water 
for both the Houses and the Factory, divided equally. 
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Figure 29 Simulation Plant for the Water System 
 
Figure 30 indicates the functionality within The Water Distribution System, again through the use 
of a process flow diagram. 
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Figure 30 the Process Flow for the Water System 
5.5 Factory  
Next, the factory is presented. Figure 31 displays the expanded view of the three different Critical 
Infrastructures linked to the Factory System. Two Critical Infrastructures, the water and the 
electricity, supply the system so that it can provide its services. Waste from the factory is 
dispatched to the Sewage System. Moreover, the Factory System consists of five different 
components presented in Table 7. 
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Figure 31 Factory System Components Diagram and location within the 8 Critical 
Infrastructures 
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Table 7: Simulation Factory Components 
 
 
Figure 32 illustrates the components within the Factory System. The Factory System uses 
electricity in order to operate the machines; it also uses a water pipe from the main Water System 
and transfers it to the Sewage System by pipeline. 
 
Figure 32 Simulation Plant for the System 
 
Figure 33 indicates the functionality of the two parallel processes, (the Water System and the 
Electricity System) that are work within the Factory. 
Components 
1. Single process  2. Mixture 
3. Single process 1  4. Sewage pipe  
5. Water pipe 
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Figure 33 the Process Flow for the Factory 
5.6 Nuclear Power System  
In this subsection, one of the electricity sources, the Nuclear Power System, is explained. Figure 
34 displays the expanded view of the Nuclear Power System. The system links only to the 
Electricity systems. Moreover, the Nuclear System consists of 30 different components and 4 inner 
systems that are indicated in Table 8.  
Table 8: Simulation Nuclear Power Components 
Components 
1.pump 1 in the 
main Nuclear 
Power  
2. water pipe from 
the nuclear 
pump2  
3. the fuel in the 
nuclear control 
rods 
4. warm water pipe in 
the main nuclear 
power  
5.cooling water 
pipe in the main 
nuclear power  
6.water pipe in 
containment 
7.control rods 
pressures 
8.cooling nuclear 
tower  
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9.the steam line in 
the nuclear 
condenser 
10. Steam Generator 
in containment  
11. steam line 1 from 
the containment to 
the turbine  
12. vapour pipe in the 
nuclear power 
13. cool water pipe 
in the condenser  
14. steam line in 
containment  
15. steam line1  in the 
nuclear turbine 
16. generator 
17. dismantle station 
in the condenser 
18. reactors  19. the Nuclear 
Turbine 
20. transformer  
21. cool water pipe 2 
in the condenser  
22. pipe1 in control 
rods 
23. dismantle station 
in the nuclear 
turbine 
24. electricity cable 
from the nuclear 
power to the 
Smart Grid  
25. warm water pipe 
in the condenser 
26. containment 
pump  
27. steam line 2 in nuclear turbine 
28. pump 2 in the 
main nuclear 
power  
29. pipe 2 in the 
control rods 
30. steam line 2 from the nuclear turbine to the 
nuclear condenser  
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Figure 34  Nuclear System Components Diagram and location within the 8 Critical 
Infrastructures 
Figure 35 and 36 illustrates the components within the Nuclear Power System and the Inner 
Nuclear System. The system consists of a pump to send cooling water to the condenser through 
pipes. Another pump is responsible for sending the water from the condenser through the water 
pipe to a steam generator. Steam lines are used to send the steam between the reactor and the 
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turbine. Finally, the nuclear system turbine sends the steam to the generator in order to transfer 
energy to the electricity grid infrastructure. 
 
Figure 35 Simulation Plant for the Nuclear System 
 
Figure 36 Simulation Plant for the Nuclear Inner System 
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The Nuclear Power System functionality is illustrated in more detail, by the process flow in Figure 
37. 
 
Figure 37 the Process Flow for the Nuclear System 
5.7 Coal System 
The second electricity source is the Coal System. Figure 38 displays the expanded view of the Coal 
System. The system only links to the Electricity systems. Moreover, the Coal System consists of 
22 different components and 3 inner systems, which are presented in Table 9. 
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Figure 38 Coal System Components Diagram and location within the 8th Critical Infrastructures 
 
Table 9: Simulation Coal Components 
Components 
1. coal tunnel to coal 
boiler  
2. the coal turbine  3. the condenser cooling in the 
coal 
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4. coal tube in the boiler 5. a steam pipe in turbine to 
the condenser 
6. cool water pipe in the coal 
condenser 
7. cool water pipe in the 
boiler 
8. dismantle station in 
turbine 
9. cool water pipe from the 
coal condenser to the coal 
boiler 
10. the coal heat tube in 
boiler 
11. steam pipe in turbine to 
the generator 
12. generator  
13. coal furnace in the 
boiler 
14. steam pipe  from 
turbine to condenser  
15. transformer  
16. the steam pipe in  the 
boiler 
17. steam pipe from the 
coal turbine in the coal 
condenser 
18. electricity cable in the coal 
to the SG 
19. steam pipe from the 
boiler to the coal 
turbine 
20. water pumper in coal condenser 
21. steam pipe in coal 
turbine 
22. water pipe in coal condenser 
Figure 39 and 40 illustrate the components within the Coal Distrusted System and the Inner Coal 
System. The system consists of a boiler, heater, and a steam line to send the steam for both turbine 
and cooling system, and a water pump to send the water through the pipe to the cooling system. 
Similarly to the Nuclear Plant, the Coal System turbine sends the steam to the generator in order 
to generate electricity. 
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Figure 39 Simulation Plant for the Coal System 
 
Figure 40 Simulation Plant for the Coal Inner System 
The Coal process flow functionality is demonstrated in Figure 41. 
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Figure 41 the Process Flow for the Coal System 
5.8 Hydroelectricity System  
Another electricity source is the Hydroelectricity system, which is presented in this subsection. 
Figure 42 displays the expanded view of the discussed Critical Infrastructure. The system links 
only to the Electricity systems. Moreover, the Hydroelectricity System consists of nine different 
components that are displayed in Table 10. 
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Figure 42 Hydroelectricity System Components Diagram and location within the 8 Critical 
Infrastructures 
Table 10: Simulation Hydroelectricity Components 
Components 
1. Water pipe from the sewage to the 
Hydroelectricity  
2. the turbine  
3. buffer in the Hydroelectricity system 4. generator 
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5. water pipe 1 from sewage in the 
Hydroelectricity system  
6. transformer 
7. sluice-gate  8. electricity cable 
9. water pipe 2  
The Hydroelectricity System components consist of a water source, which is the sea, and a second 
source from the sewage system recycling. A sluice gate controls the water level using water pipes. 
These components presented in Figure 43. 
 
Figure 43 Simulation Plant for the Hydroelectricity System 
Figure 44 indicates the Hydroelectricity process flow performance in depth. 
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Figure 44 the Process Flow for the Hydroelectricity System 
5.9 Sewage System 
The final material generating infrastructure is the Sewage, and Figure 45 displays the expanded 
view. Three different Critical Infrastructures are linked with the Sewage System; including the 
Houses, the Factory and the Hydroelectricity System. The system collects the waste from both 
Houses and Factory System and sends re-filtered water to the Hydroelectricity System. Moreover, 
the Sewage System consists of eight different components that are indicated in Table 11. 
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Figure 45 Sewage System Components Diagram and location within the 8 Critical 
Infrastructures 
Table 11: Simulation Sewage Components 
Components 
1. sewage pipe from houses  2. Primary process  
118 
 
3. sewage pipe from factory  4. second process  
5. sewage pipe 1  6. assembly process  
7. Screening  8. water pipe  
The Sewage System components are indicated in Figure 46. A FlowController is used as a 
controller for sending the waste through the main pipe. The waste goes through three main 
processes in order to re-filter the water; these include screening, primary filtration and secondary 
filtration. Finally, the re-filtered water is sent to the Hydroelectricity System by a pipe. 
 
Figure 46 Simulation Plant for the Sewage System 
The Sewage process functionality steps are indicated in detail in Figure 47. 
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Figure 47 the Process Flow for the Sewage System 
5.10 Housing Compound 
The final infrastructure in the system is the housing complex, displayed in Figure 48. The Houses 
rely on three main Critical Infrastructures, the Water System, the Electricity System and the 
Sewage System. Both the water and the electricity are provider to the Houses and the waste is 
disposed to the Sewage System. Moreover, the Houses contain 27 different components, which 
are presented in Table 12.  
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Figure 48 Houses System Components Diagram and location within the 8 Critical 
Infrastructures 
Table 12: Simulation Houses Components 
Components 
1. main cable electricity 
houses  
2. cable electricity 6  3. pipe sewage 1  
4. main pipe water houses 5. water meter 1  6. pipe sewage 3  
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7. electricity meter 1  8. water meter 2  9. pipe sewage 5  
10. electricity meter 2  11. water pipe 1 in odd 
houses 
12. pipe sewage 2  
13. electricity cable1  14. pipe water 3 in odd 
houses 
15. pipe sewage 4  
16. cable electricity 3  17. pipe water 5 in odd 
houses 
18. pipe sewage 6  
19. cable electricity 5  20. water pipe 2 in even 
houses 
21. Assembly sewage for odd 
houses 
22. cable electricity 2  23. water pipe inside 
houses 1 
24. assembly sewage for 
even houses 
25. cable electricity 4  26. water pipe inside 
house 2 
27. main sewage pipe  
The housing compound, Figure 49, is an end-user of the services provided by the other 
infrastructure in the system. The diagram can be broken down into four main groups of objects. 
The groups include supply lines from other infrastructures, for example: 
1. Electricity power plant input to houses 
2. Water Distribution System inputs to houses 
3. Housing compound 
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4. Sewage drains from houses to external infrastructure 
 
Figure 49 Simulation Plant for the Houses 
Figure 50 indicates the functionality of the two parallel processes; the Water System and the 
Electricity System that are working within the Houses.  
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Figure 50 the Process Flow for the Houses 
5.11 Simulation  
To this point, we presented a digital model; in order to represent a realistic environment, two main 
steps need to be specified in the model to reach this aim. These include an event controller and the 
system availability percentage. 
5.11.1 Event Controller 
Firstly, an event controller was inserted into the simulation process to control speed was 
implemented. Figure 51 indicates the event controller interface used to influence the speed of 
operation. In addition, a set time for simulation can be inserted.  For the dataset used in this 
research, we set the time for 2 days. 
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Figure 51 the Simulation Control Events 
5.11.2 System Availability  
Within the simulation, each of the components has a random failure implemented. This was done 
to make the system behave differently each time it runs and to account for faults, which occur in 
real-life Critical Infrastructures. Random failures are implement an Availability Percentage. The 
Availability Percentage refers to the chances of a machine or components being ready to use at 
any given time taking into account failures and blockages, which is calculated using the formula: 
 
Availability = A/ (A+B) 
(1) 
 
Where B represents MTTR, which is the Mean Time To Repair and A represents MTBF, which is 
the Mean Time Between Failures. In the following subsection, an example of abnormal behaviour, 
which could occur in the Water Distribution System and the Electricity Power Plant, is highlighted. 
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The behaviour changes are created by altering the availability percentages for the different 
components.  
5.12 The Simulation Environment 
Each object in our model has their own parameters that define how the materials flow through our 
environment. Figure 52 indicates the system functionality; the blue discrete block represents the 
water flow. While the green discrete blocks represent the electricity flow. The functionality of the 
system is stable and regular during run-time.  
 
Figure 52 the System Flow Materials: Water, Electricity 
In order to track the flow of services in the system, a Sankey Diagram is employed. The diagram 
visualises the material flow; moreover, it helps in producing a productive environment. Figures 53 
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to 55 indicate the electricity flow between the different materials and the methods. The heavier the 
line the more material is transported across the machines. 
It is clear that the electricity flow, which is presented by the yellow line in Figure 53, is the heaviest 
between the Hydroelectricity System and the Electricity System, followed by three Critical 
Infrastructures, the Nuclear Power System, the Houses and the Water Distribution System. On the 
other hand, the lowest transportation is between the Electricity System, the Factory and the Coal 
System.  
 
Figure 53 the Electricity transportation Simulation Sankey Stream between the Critical 
Infrastructures 
Figure 54 provides more visualisation details regarding the level of material that flows in the 
Electricity System and it can indicate that the transportation from the Coal System was the Lowest. 
Finally, the electricity flow between the houses is almost equal and it was governed by the 
FlowControl component. 
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Figure 54 the Electricity transportation Simulation Sankey Stream within the Electricity System 
 
Figure 55 the Electricity transportation Simulation Sankey Stream between the Houses 
Figures 56 to 58 indicates the water flow between the different materials and the methods. The 
heavier the line the more material is transported across the machines. It is clear that the water flow, 
which is presented by the blue line in Figure 56, was the heaviest between the Hydroelectricity 
System and the Sewage System; followed by Houses and the Factory Critical Infrastructures, 
which is presented also by Figure 57.  
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Figure 56 the Water transportation Simulation Sankey Stream between the Critical 
Infrastructures 
 
Figure 57 the Water transportation Simulation Sankey Stream in the Water System 
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Figure 58 the Water transportation Simulation Sankey Stream between the Houses 
Finally, Figure 58 presented the water transportation flow between the houses and it is clear that 
the levels of the materials are different. 
5.13 System Behaviour  
The data construction process depends on the connectivity between the different systems and the 
systems’ faults, each based on realistic infrastructure behaviour. The expectation is that, through 
analysing the data from different attack scenarios on the system, cyber-attacks can be 
communicated between different infrastructures and suitable countermeasures can be established. 
The trends in data patterns for both normal and abnormal behaviour can be identified and 
communicated to prevent future impacts. In this section, we present a snapshot for of normal and 
abnormal data. In order to understand the behaviour of the system, two datasets are constructed 
from The Water Distribution Infrastructure System. A normal system set constructed from a two 
days simulation. Then faults were introduced to the system as abnormal behaviours in order to 
construct a dataset of the system under attack. Blocks of data are extracted to prevent data overload 
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and to support building the features from both normal and abnormal datasets. This resulted in 
691,200 rows of both normal and abnormal raw data for the two days of simulation. Based on the 
data collected, a number of features were extracted from both normal and abnormal behaviours. 
The whole simulation consists of 147 components in total. However, Table 13 presents the Water 
Distribution components in detail. The numbers in the tables represent the units, which flow in the 
water pipe. However, more datasets are presented in the Appendix A that show how it helped shape 
the research. 
Table 13: Component Description for Water Distribution Infrastructure 
Abbreviation Component Description 
F1 Electricity cable from the Electricity Grid to the WD in the 
WD 
F2 Water pipe 1 from the source in the WD 
F3 WD  Assembly 
F4 Water pipe 2 in the WD 
F5           WD treatment 
F6 Water pipe 3 after the treatment in the WD 
F7 WD Storage 
F8 Water pipe 4 in the WD 
F9 Water pipe from WD to Houses in the WD 
F10 Water pipe from WD to Factory in the WD 
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5.13.1 Normal Data Collection  
Table 14 shows data for normal behaviour for the Water Distribution System. 
Table 14: Snap of the Model of the Normal Data Sample in the Water Distribution System 
Time F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 
Normal Data Set 
01:57.0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
01:57.2 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:57.5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:57.8 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:58.0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:58.3 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:58.5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:58.7 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:59.0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
5.13.2 Abnormal Data Collection  
A number of recognised faults were introduced into the simulation in order to understand the 
different records that the system would produce and how to differentiate these records from normal 
operation of the system. As for the normal system, these faults were simulated over a period of 
two days to create a balanced dataset. Table 15 presents the faults where the percentages indicate 
the level of unavailability.  
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Table 15: Number of Different Faults in the Critical Infrastructures  
Faults 
The main 
system  
Water pipe 
from the 
water D.S to 
the House 
compound 
40% 
Electricity 
cable from the 
Electricity 
Grid to the 
House 
compound 
30% 
Electricity 
cable from the 
Hydroelectrici
ty system to 
the Electricity 
Grid  20% 
Electricit
y cable 
from the 
nuclear 
Power 
system to 
the 
Electricit
y Grid 
60% 
Sewage 
Pipe 
from the 
House 
compoun
d to the 
Sewage 
system 
25% 
Coal System  Heat tube in 
the coal boiler 
40% 
Steam pipe in 
the coal 
condenser 
50% 
Electricity 
cable in the 
coal to the 
smart grid 
25% 
  
Electricity 
cable in the 
coal to the 
smart grid 
40% 
Coal turbine 
35%  
Coal tunnel to 
the boiler 35% 
  
Electricity 
System 
Electricity 
cable from 
hydroelectrici
ty system 
60% 
Electricity 
cable to 
houses 50% 
   
Electricity 
cable from 
nuclear power 
70% 
Electricity 
cable to water 
distribution 
60%   
Electricity 
cable to 
factory 80%  
  
Electricity 
cable from 
coal 40% 
Electricity 
cable from 
hydroelectrici
ty  system  
50% 
Electricity 
cable to 
houses 60% 
  
Factory  Single 
processing 
unit (proc) 
50% 
Water pipe in 
the factory 
40% 
   
Water System  Water pipe 1 
50% 
Water pipe to 
houses 60% 
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Electricity 
cable 40% 
Water pipe 1 
60% 
Water pipe to 
factory 70% 
  
Electricity 
cable 60% 
Water pipe to 
houses 50% 
   
Houses Elec Meter 1 
20% 
Elec Meter 2 
50% 
Water pipe to 
the meters 
40% 
Main 
sewage 
pipe 
from the 
houses to 
the 
sewage 
system 
30% 
Elec 
Flow 
control 
in the 
electricit
y 70/30 
Electricity 
cable to the 
meters 50% 
Water Meter 
1 30% 
Water Meter  
2 40% 
Water 
Flow 
control 
in the 
water 
80/20 
Flow 
control 
before 
the 
sewage 
pipe 
80/20  
Hydroelectrici
ty 
System  
Water pipe 
from sewage 
system 50%  
Electricity 
cable 30% 
   
Water pipe 1 
40% 
Turbine 50%    
Sewage 
System 
Sewage pipe 
from houses 
60%  
Sewage pipe1 
40% 
   
Sewage pipe 
from factory 
50% 
Screening 
30% 
Water sewage 
to the 
hydroelectricit
y system 60% 
  
Nuclear 
System 
Cool water 
pipe in the 
nuclear 
system 40% 
Reactor in the 
control rods 
35% 
Nuclear 
turbine 50%  
Electricit
y cable 
from the 
nuclear 
to the 
grid 40% 
 
Steam line in 
the nuclear 
power 30% 
Steam line 2 
from the 
turbine to the 
condenser 
nuclear 45% 
Generator 
60% 
Electricit
y cable 
from the 
nuclear 
to the 
grid 30% 
Cool 
water 
pipe to 
the pump 
in the 
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However, for the purpose of this section, we choose to present one of the abnormal behaviours in 
the Water Distribution System. It is clear that between the time 1:57 to 1:59 the level of the water 
was increased, which is indicated by Table 16.  
Table 16: Snap of the Model of the Abnormal Data Sample in the Water Distribution System 
Time F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 
Abnormal Data Set 
01:57.0 0 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
01:57.2 0 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
01:57.5 0 3 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
01:57.8 0 3 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
01:58.0 0 3 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
01:58.3 0 3 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
01:58.5 0 3 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
01:58.7 0 3 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
01:59.0 0 3 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
5.14 Summary 
This chapter presented our Critical Infrastructures simulation model used for data collection. The 
simulation is based on a semi-structured interview that helped to shape a real-world system using 
the Siemens Tecnomatix Plant Simulation program. Data flows are also highlighted for the water 
and the electricity materials in order to give a clear visualized point of view by using the Sankey 
condense
r 40% 
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Diagram. Finally, two samples of datasets were pointed out to show the system behaviour with 
normal and abnormal data sets. This data is used in the following section for our evaluation and 
results. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EVALUATION 
6.1 Introduction 
The Water Distribution System is one of the key utilities in the infrastructure grouping and is 
heavily relied upon by the general population [140]. As such, the results presented focus on the 
Water Distribution System in this evaluation. This chapter is divided into two main sections: the 
outcomes of a semi-structured interview used to shape the second section. Moving to the second 
section, describes the attacks scenario followed by the results and data sharing process.  
6.2 The Semi-Structured Interview Statistical Report  
The outcomes of the interview are presented in a statistical report. The problem was displayed in 
detail with the practical solution, which the Saudi Water Ministry choose. The semi-structured 
interview discussed the following points: 
 The role that water distribution plays in our lives and how important the water 
infrastructure is. 
 The failures that face the water infrastructure 
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 The different attacks the system faces and the process to solve it 
 Interconnectivity between the water infrastructure and other infrastructures.  
6.2.1 Interview Outcomes  
The outcome of each question is analysed individually and highlighted as follows: 
Question 1: 
This question was asked in order to understand how important the water system is and try to relate 
it to research.   
Answer 1: 
The infrastructure of water networks consists of several basic elements: water connections with a 
counter, sub-lines, main lines, storage, pumping stations and treatment stations. These elements 
are always exposed to some faults for many reasons.  The damage increases within the small 
elements, such as the house connection pipes. Therefore, the authorized stakeholders need to 
provide suitable maintenance teams that commensurate with the needs of each element of the water 
system. 
Question 2: 
The second question asked about the problem that the water distribution had and if these problems 
involve security aspects.  
 
Answer 2: 
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The water distribution system faces technical problems that can be highlighted as follow: 
 Leakage resulting from natural disasters as floods.  
 There is no clear plan that outlines the path of the water pipes. 
 Lack of remote control systems and the water network work mostly by rotation, which 
made it easy to hack it. 
 Old water network and the difficulties of renewing it.  
 Lack of professional trainers, which made it hard to do preventative maintenance. 
 Lack of spare parts  
 The lack of security units guarding the water tanks against tampering 
 Still, the Saudi water distribution system uses the old water meters. 
On the other hand, the attacks, which the water distribution system faced, can be highlighted in 
two main points: 
 Entering the customer account and changing the usage rate either by an insider or by an 
outsider. 
 The possibility of disabling the subscriber system, and remote operating systems 
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Question 3: 
Different regulation could be found in different organization. Therefore, this question was 
concerned with tactics and regulation toward technical failures. 
Answer 3: 
New rules have been changed in order to improve the system. Use a backup system to keep the 
information in a safe place. Update the control system and export the physical network to 
simulation programs. Reconstruct the old water network to cooperate with people’s needs. 
Moreover, contract with new expertise that can maintain the water system, improve it, and create 
a new check-up system concerned with house water tanks in order to indicate any manipulation.   
Question 4: 
This question was asked in order to identify the interconnectivity between the water infrastructure 
and the other infrastructures.  
Answer 4: 
The water distribution system is connected to different infrastructures, such as a sewage 
distribution system, electricity grid, telecoms, etc. in addition, more interdependency can be found 
depending on expansion within systems. 
Question 5: 
The final question was about a realistic scenario, which the water distribution face and the way 
they have handle it. This question helped in implementing our system. 
Answer 5: 
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The engineer highlighted three real scenarios. However, for the aim of this research one of these 
scenarios was only chosen to implement. The next section describes the scenario.    
6.2.2 The Scenario 
Heavy rainfall led to displacement of the main water line, which connects the water source to the 
main water station in Makkah. In addition, three sub-lines were shifted from their location leaving 
a major leakage. Moreover, the water affected the electricity cables near them and the availability 
was only 60% for two days.     
As soon as the admin in the Saudi ministry received the notification, a maintenance team were sent 
to lock the main water taps. A number of procedures were taken to address the situation and 
minimize the problem. Table 17 indicates the procedures and the time, which the maintenance 
team took in order to fix the problem.  
Table 17 the Procedure of fixing one of the failures in the water system by the maintenance team and the time. 
Procedure Time 
Close the main water seal valve  60 minutes  
Determine the size of the damage  30 minutes  
Determine the appropriate way to solve 
the problem 
60 minutes 
Indicates the required pieces of 
materials, equipment and workers 
30 minutes  
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Prepare the chosen requirements and 
bring it to the work site 
120 minutes  
Repair  the water lines  14.50 hours  
Open the main  water seal valve and 
run the system gradually  
60 minutes 
 
Depending on the procedure, which the maintenance team took and the time, the ratio of non-
operation of the main pipe was calculated. This ratio was used to simulate the scenario with 
Tecnomatix. The percentage of water pipe defects is calculated using the formula: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠
 × 100 
                                                                                                                                                (2)   
Depending on the formula, the ratio of non-operation in the main water pipe is 60%. By stimulating 
this scenario this helped reach the aims of this thesis.  
6.3 Water Distribution System: Case Study 
Based on the semi-structured interview this section was formed. The Water Critical Infrastructure 
consists of the following:  
 Water distribution networks, such as mainlines, sub lines and household connections.  
 Pumping stations. 
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 Tanks, such as operational and a reservoir. 
 Dams for storage. 
 Treatment stations. 
These components are all present in the simulation and can be a target for an attacker. The choice 
to study the Water Distribution System is based on some aspects, which are considered as follows: 
1) The importance of water and the direct impact on human life. 
2) Depending on the economic collapse, some cities cannot invest in developing or changing 
their old water system.  
3) Protecting the Water Critical Infrastructure includes securing all the transportation parts, 
such as sources, treatment plants, pipes and the distribution system (Bearing in mind the 
various water sources that might be used: ground sources, rain, surface water, sea, etc.).  
4) The Water Critical Infrastructure is considered to be one of the core Infrastructures and is 
comprised of three Infrastructures in itself: the drinking-water supply system, the sewage 
system and the stormwater runoff control systems [141]. 
5) There is a connection between energy and the water system, which created a cascade failure 
between the systems. Therefore, by moderating the water and wastewater usage there is a 
direct impact on energy provision. 
Figure 59 shows the Water Distribution System components.  
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Figure 59 Water Distribution System Components Diagram 
Starting with the water source, which needs to be available and accessible, water pipes and pumps 
are designed to meet the customer demands. One of the important components of this system is 
water treatment. This part needs to meet a standard depending on the location, in order to cover 
water consumption and quality. Water can be stored underground or in tanks and is used in peak 
demand. Finally, the distribution system that stores the water for houses or factory is used when 
needed. Figure 60 presents the Water Distribution System constructed in Tecnomatix Plant 
Simulation. 
144 
 
 
Figure 60 Plant Simulation for the Water Distribution System Components 
6.3.1 The Abnormal Water Distribution Behaviours  
A number of recognised faults are introduced to the Water System as abnormal behaviours, which 
are indicated in Table 18. One of these failures is chosen and explained in depth. As we highlighted 
earlier in the thesis, in order to present the productive simulation environment a ‘system 
availability’ needs to be specified, which is clear in Table 18. Therefore, by reducing the 
availability percentage in certain components in the water system, a threat behaviour dataset can 
be constructed. 
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Table 18: The Water Distribution System Abnormal Behaviours 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As an example, water pipe 1 and the water pipe that links to the houses, only function correctly for 
50% and 60% correspondingly during runtime. However, each time the availability percentage 
was reduced it was important to check the overall total system availability performance. 
6.3.2 Data Figures 
Figure 61 displays the abnormal flow in the Water System depending on the abnormal behaviour 
introduced to water pipe 1 and the water pipe connected to the houses, which is present in Table 
17. A Bottleneck Analyser is used to show the statistical data graphically on top of each 
component. Figure 62 indicates a chart for the water abnormal behaviour effect on five 
components. It is clear that three components were blocked during processing. This included the 
assembly, treatment and the storage components.  
Failures  Components Available Not available 
1 Electricity cable  60% 40% 
Water pipe to houses 50% 50% 
2 Electricity cable  40% 60% 
Water pipe 1  60% 40% 
Water pipe to factory 70% 30% 
3 Water pipe 1  50% 50% 
Water pipe to houses 60% 40% 
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Figure 61 The Abnormal behaviour in Water Distribution System: water pipe 1 &water pipe to 
the houses 
 
 
Figure 62 The Abnormal Chart for the Water Distribution System: water pipe 1 &water pipe to 
the houses 
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6.3.3 Datasets for Evaluation  
This section presents the evaluation of the abnormal data set process for CIAIRS. CIAIRS uses a 
summative evaluation to improve the service within Critical Infrastructures. Data analysis is 
conducted using data visualisation to identify system anomalies and demonstrate that models of 
behaviour can be constructed and shared with other infrastructures. 
Table 19 and 20 show data samples for normal and abnormal behaviour in the Water Distribution 
Infrastructure. 
Table 19: The Water Distribution Normal Data Set 
Time F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 
Normal Data Set 
01:51.5 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
01:51.8 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
01:52.0 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
01:52.3 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
01:52.5 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
01:52.7 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
01:53.0 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
01:53.2 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
01:53.5 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
01:53.8 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
01:54.0 0 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
01:54.3 0 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
01:54.5 0 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
01:54.8 0 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
01:55.0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
01:55.3 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
01:55.5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
01:55.8 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
01:56.0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
01:56.3 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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01:56.5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
01:56.7 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
01:57.0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
01:57.2 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:57.5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:57.8 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:58.0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:58.3 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:58.5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:58.7 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:59.0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
01:59.3 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:59.5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 20: The Water Distribution Abnormal Data set 
Time F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 
Abnormal Data Set 
01:51.5 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:51.8 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:52.0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:52.3 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:52.5 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:52.7 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:53.0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:53.2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:53.5 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:53.8 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:54.0 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:54.3 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:54.5 2 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:54.8 2 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:55.0 2 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:55.3 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:55.5 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:55.8 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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01:56.0 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01:56.3 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
01:56.5 0 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
01:56.7 0 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
01:57.0 0 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
01:57.2 0 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
01:57.5 0 3 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
01:57.8 0 3 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
01:58.0 0 3 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
01:58.3 0 3 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
01:58.5 0 3 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
01:58.7 0 3 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
01:59.0 0 3 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
01:59.3 0 3 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 
01:59.5 0 3 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 
 
The process involves detecting abnormal behaviour for sharing with other infrastructures. The 
Water Distribution Infrastructure consists of 10 components. Data collection was conducted with 
a sampling rate of 4 Hertz (which is one sample every 0.25 seconds) for two days. This sampling 
rate was chosen as often small, subtle changes of material flow take place within a 1 second period; 
a low sampling rate of 4 Hertz allowed us to detect these changes. This resulted in 691,200 rows 
of both normal and abnormal raw data after 2 days of simulation. From the datasets, records of 
data were constructed by selecting features from the datasets at 5-minute intervals [43]. The 
records used in the classification process consist of 572 normal and 572 abnormal behaviour 
records.  
6.3.4 The Statistical Reports  
Comparing Tables 21 and 22, it is clear that the production of the electricity in houses dropped 
from 71.75% to 61.19% and the production of the electricity in the factory also decreased by 10%. 
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The result indicates that the attacks, which accrued in the Water Distribution Infrastructure, have 
affected the production of the electricity in two other infrastructures including a factory and 
housing complex.  
Table 21: The Normal Production Statistical Report for the Water Distribution Infrastructure 
 
Table 22: The Abnormal Production Statistical Report for the Water Distribution Infrastructure 
 
6.3.5 Descriptive Feature Extraction  
In order to detect anomalous behaviour automatically for sharing with other infrastructures, 
features must be extracted from the dataset for use in the data analysis process. This subsection 
presents six features: Mean, Max, Min, Std, Mode and Median. Figure 63 illustrates the descriptive 
statistical types. The descriptive statistics are used in order to describe the data and not to conclude 
or prove a hypothesis [142]. The central aim is to help to describe the centre position for the data 
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and the common pattern. While, the measure of spread helps to study the distribution of the data, 
the two descriptive types are considered to be the most common data sets when analysing features 
that are used to understand the meaning of the whole data or a sample [143]. 
 
Figure 63 The Descriptive Statistical Types 
Table 23 and 24 presents a sample of the feature vector records from the normal and abnormal 
behaviour in the water system constructed using the above features. 
Table 23: Snap Shot for The Normal Water Distribution Vector Records 
 
Table 24: Snap Shot for the Abnormal Water Distribution Vector Records 
Normal 
Avr. water 
pipe 1 from 
the source 
in the WD
max min mode std median
water pipe 
from WD 
to Houses 
in the WD
max min mode std median
Record 1 2.975 3 0 3 0.185482263 3 0.033333 1 0 0 0.179580334 0
Record 2 2.9941715 3 2 3 0.076153358 3 0.013322 1 0 0 0.114698316 0
Record 3 2.9975021 3 2 3 0.049937513 3 0.006661 1 0 0 0.081377265 0
Record 4 2.9941715 3 2 3 0.076153358 3 0.013322 1 0 0 0.114698316 0
Record 5 2.9975021 3 2 3 0.049937513 3 0.006661 1 0 0 0.081377265 0
Record 6 2.9941715 3 2 3 0.076153358 3 0.013322 1 0 0 0.114698316 0
Record 7 2.9975021 3 2 3 0.049937513 3 0.006661 1 0 0 0.081377265 0
Record 8 2.9941715 3 2 3 0.076153358 3 0.013322 1 0 0 0.114698316 0
Record 9 2.9975021 3 2 3 0.049937513 3 0.006661 1 0 0 0.081377265 0
Record 10 2.9941715 3 2 3 0.076153358 3 0.013322 1 0 0 0.114698316 0
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6.3.6 Detection Normal and Abnormal Behaviours  
This subsection details the process involved in detecting abnormal behaviour for sharing with other 
infrastructures. The system consists of 147 components in total and for the purpose of the 
evaluation; nine components are used, which belong to the water distribution system.  
The water system components provide 108 normal and abnormal features, and 48 records for the 
classification process consisting of 24 normal and 24 abnormal behaviour records. However, since 
the difference was clear in the mean and the standard deviation values, they were chosen to use as 
main features. Consequently, the nine water system components provide 18 features for each 
normal and abnormal behaviour records. Therefore, the water distribution vector records consist 
of 864 feature vectors, 432 normal and 432 abnormal behaviour records. The full normal and 
abnormal vector records are presented in Appendix C. 
Table 25 presents the results of the classification process, which involved using seven well-known 
machine-learning algorithms. Fergus et. al,. clarifies their usage as follows [144], the linear 
discriminant classifier (LDC), the quadratic discriminant classifier (QDC), uncorrelated normal 
density based classifier (UDC), the polynomial classifier (POLYC), parzen classifier (PARZENC), 
k-Nearest Neighbour (KNNC) and the support vector classifier (SVC). LDC, QDC and UDC are 
Abnormal
Avr. 
water 
pipe 1 
from the 
source in 
the WD
max min mode std median
water 
pipe from 
WD to 
Houses in 
the WD
max min mode std median
Record 1 2.9775 3 0 3 0.178943 3 0.033333 1 0 0 0.17958 0
Record 2 2.995004 3 2 3 0.070534 3 0.013322 1 0 0 0.114698 0
Record 3 2.995004 3 2 3 0.070534 3 0.006661 1 0 0 0.081377 0
Record 4 2.994172 3 2 3 0.076153 3 0.009992 1 0 0 0.099499 0
Record 5 2.999167 3 2 3 0.028855 3 0.009992 1 0 0 0.099499 0
Record 6 2.994172 3 2 3 0.076153 3 0.006661 1 0 0 0.081377 0
Record 7 2.997502 3 2 3 0.049938 3 0.006661 1 0 0 0.081377 0
Record 8 2.994172 3 2 3 0.076153 3 0.013322 1 0 0 0.114698 0
Record 9 2.769359 3 2 3 0.421419 3 0.006661 1 0 0 0.081377 0
Record 10 2.994172 3 2 3 0.076153 3 0.006661 1 0 0 0.081377 0
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density-based classifiers. LDC generates discriminant functions for not normally distributed. 
While QDC assumes that the dataset follows a normal distribution function. UDC works parallel 
as QDC but computation of a quadratic classifier, between the classes in the dataset, is done by 
assuming normal densities with uncorrelated features [145]. 
The POLYC uses an untrained classifier with the dataset and adds polynomial features. PARZENC 
is considered a non-linear classifier that uses the training dataset and their parameters when 
building the classifier. The SVC support vector classifier is used in industry with a non-labelled 
dataset or few labels in order to point decide which class a new data point is in. NaivebC considers 
each of the contributed features independently to the probability [146]. 
Using the above classifiers to detect anomalous behaviour, ParzenC and KNNC obtain the best 
values. In addition, their Sensitivity and Specificity detection rates are also higher than other 
classifiers. This refers to the detection of normal and abnormal behaviours respectively. 
Table 25: Classification Results for the Water Distribution System 
Classifiers AUC% Sensitivity Specificity 
LDC 79.17 0.706 1.000 
UDC 50.00 0.500 0.500 
QDC 50.00 0.500 0.500 
SVC 75.00 0.667 1.000 
Parzenc 87.50 0.800 1.000 
KNNC 87.50 0.800 1.000 
 
Using the above techniques anomalous behaviour is detected and communicated to other 
infrastructures for mitigation and remediation planning, depending on the normal and abnormal 
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behaviour. Moreover, it is clear from the above techniques, that the selected classifiers can be used 
to identify abnormal behaviours in multiple Critical Infrastructure types.  
In addition, by using statistical measures or classification functions sensitivity and specificity offer 
positive and negative results for the data set, respectively. In other words, using these measures 
helped in identifying the level of accuracy detection between normal and abnormal system 
behaviour.  
The sensitivity and specificity results were successful in detecting the normal behaviour. The 
results support that we could take advantage of assessing system behaviours to create a Critical 
Infrastructure support network. The aim is to alert other associated infrastructures about detected 
attacks, which could cause cascading impacts and advise an operator of the most appropriate 
response action.  
Figure 64(a) displays a graph of the ParzenC classification. The ellipses displayed, refer to 
likelihood contours, where the points inside the ellipse are most likely to belong to that grouping. 
The blue ellipses consist of data that comes from the normal behaviour dataset and the red referring 
to threat behaviour data. Threat behaviour can be identified as a result of one grouping clearly 
standing out from the other. 
The process functions by creating a scatter plot of the values from both of the selected features 
then drawing the ellipses based on the division of the data. The ellipses, displayed, refer to 
likelihood contours, where the points inside the ellipse are most likely to belong to that grouping. 
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 (a)   (b) 
 
Figure 64 ParzenC Visualisation & KNNC Visualisation 
The blue ellipses consist of data that comes from the normal behaviour dataset and the red ones 
referring to threat behaviour data. Threat behaviour can be identified as a result of one grouping 
clearly standing out from the other. Similarly, Figure 64(b) displays a visualisation of the 
classification results for the KNNC classification process. Feature 1, on the x-axis, refers to one of 
the dominant features and Feature 2, on the y-axis, and refers to one of the less dominant features 
from the dataset. The graph displays that some changes in behaviour can be identified but often 
some are subtle and difficult to identify. 
6.4 Summary 
Critical Infrastructure interconnectivity is one the main challenges when countering the growing 
cyber-threat. This chapter presents a statistical report about the semi-structured interview by a 
professional Saudi engineer that works in the Water Saudi Ministry. Moreover, the chapter 
demonstrates how the system detects abnormal behaviour within a Critical Infrastructure and 
offers an approach for sharing the information with other infrastructures, using the human immune 
system as a reference model. A simulation approach was proposed for constructing big datasets 
for analysis. Using ParzenC and KNNC, two data classification techniques, we achieved high 
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accuracy in the detection of abnormal behaviours for the case study. Based on the results achieved 
in this chapter, we shaped the future work direction of the research. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK   
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis presented a novel system, known as CIAIRS, for improving the level of security within 
Critical Infrastructures. The framework depends on a combination of unique techniques that helped 
in reaching the aim of the thesis. This chapter is considered to be the final stage of this research 
and the remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, the thesis is summarised. Next, 
the main contributions of this work are presented. Finally, the future work, based on the research 
results, is discussed. 
7.2 Thesis Summary 
Designing an effective information system that helps in predicting abnormal behaviour in real time 
and shares the knowledge between different Critical Infrastructures was the main aim of this 
research. This section presents an overview of the thesis by summering each chapter, as follows: 
 Chapter 1: In this chapter, we introduced the Critical Infrastructure research area. 
Presenting a brief about Critical Infrastructures and the challenges they face. Specifically, 
this included interdependency. Next, the motivation behind the research was highlighted. 
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After that, the aims and the objectives were indicated and finally, the novelty of the work 
was outlined. 
 Chapter 2: This chapter presented an in-depth background on the Critical Infrastructure. 
In addition, a number of interdependency modelling examples were presented and the 
effects of cyber-attacks on the Critical Infrastructure network were highlighted.  
 Chapter 3: the chapter highlighted different points regarding the Critical Infrastructures, 
such as the big data and the use of the analytics for predictive, descriptive, diagnosis and 
prescriptive analysis. In addition, the chapter indicates a pattern of communication that is 
similarly used in the framework, which is the publish-subscribe. This chapter also 
presented the case study for the eight Critical infrastructures, which were used to form the 
normal and the abnormal data. Next, the eight simulated Critical Infrastructures were 
detailed by presenting their components and the process flow for each. Moreover, the 
chapter details the data construction process through two examples: the electricity and 
water infrastructures. To present the flow of material Sankey diagrams were used. Finally, 
the chapter concluded with a snapshot of the normal and abnormal datasets for the water 
infrastructure. Finally, a review of the machine learning classes is highlighted. These 
points helped in clarifying the main aspect of the research.  
 Chapter 4: This chapter presented the design of our system and framework; Critical 
Infrastructure Automated Immuno-Response System (CIAIRS). In addition, the location 
of the system within the ICS layers was outlined. Finally, a full description of each 
component was presented individually.  
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 Chapter 5: In this chapter the implementation on the Water System was presented. The 
chapter started by evaluating the normal and the abnormal datasets, which was collected 
from the Critical Infrastructure plant simulation. Next, the results were presented and the 
effectiveness of the CIAIRS system was evaluated. 
 Chapter 6: this chapter presented the evaluation for the CIAIRS system. 
 Chapter 7: A conclusion and suggestion of future work directions are presented in this 
current chapter., The chapter summarises the thesis findings and highlight the contribution 
of the research. Moreover, the chapter highlights some of the research limitations and the 
lessons learnt during the research. 
7.3 The Research Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the area of Critical Infrastructure security. Especially, it introduces a new 
way of thinking towards supporting Critical Infrastructure interdependency, in order to improve 
the level of security. By using our approach, the following is offered: 
 The adaptive behaviour the system provides has increased the Critical Infrastructure level 
of security, especially by knowing the behaviour of the system patterns. 
 We have developed the interconnectivity check process, in order to benefit from the 
connection between Critical Infrastructures. Using a dictionary to register the Critical 
Infrastructure interdependency has reduced the time it takes for the rest of the Critical 
Infrastructure to realise the attacks earlier. 
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 A novel communication process is used, which improves the level of security and 
performance for Critical Infrastructures and reduces the risk of cascading failures. 
 CIAIRS uses a number of classifiers, which combine to give a better performance for the 
system during attack situations. 
7.4 Summary of Thesis Findings  
A number of challenges faced by Critical Infrastructures have been highlighted in this thesis, such 
as protecting SCADA. The research focused on interdependency between Critical Infrastructures. 
Consequently, the research investigated this challenge further using a semi-structured interview 
with a professional Saudi Engineer who works in the Saudi Ministry of Water. As a result of this 
investigation, the second stage presented a solution by using the interdependency between the 
Critical Infrastructures as a key to alarm the different systems. Therefore, a simulation of eight 
Critical Infrastructures was created in Tecnomatix and the results of the simulation helped in 
identify the behaviour patterns of the system. The patterns built up during the training helped to 
identify specific attacks.  
Using seven classifiers, CIAIRS provides the operator with the ability to determine if the system 
is under attack or not. In addition, to prevent system overload, a window is used to extract the data.  
CIAIRS does not control the data it only spots specific types of information about attacks and 
shares it with interconnected infrastructures.     
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7.5 Research Limitations 
Although the research achieved its aim and objectives, there were some unavoidable limitations. 
First, Adequacy of the Sample data: Depending on the nature of the research problem, the sample 
may be considered small and by enlarging the sample size that could generate more results that are 
accurate. Furthermore, if the sample is magnified this gives us the ability to use more complex 
models and classifiers. However, given the nature of Critical Infrastructures and their security 
needs, obtaining large amounts of real data was not possible.  
Second, Simulation: the complexity of a system design is difficult to assess using a simulation, 
primarily due to time factors and access to real-life data. While many orders of complexity can be 
described this will never be representative of actual functions and processes in real-world 
scenarious. For this reason a comprehensive assessment of the appraoch posited in this thesis was 
not possible. Third, Time Constraints: the research constructed several Critical Infrastructures 
using an industry recognised simulator – having additional time that would have allowed me to 
explore the tool in more detail and provide a much deeper design and implementation much more 
representative of real-life installations. This would have yield more data and uncovered more 
complex patterns of behaviour.  
Finally, the design of the research interview was cross-sectional, which means the data were 
gathered at one specific point only without pre or post testing events. By including more specific 
questions in the semi-structured interview and testing it could have helped to address particular 
issues later in the study.  
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7.6 Future Work 
By reaching this section the thesis has achieved the research aims, findings and novel 
contributions. However, these contributions have themselves raised some interesting questions. 
The results in this thesis propose a strong foundation for future work in three main sections, which 
can be highlighted as follows: 
7.6.1 Broadcasting with Different Systems 
Our proposed CIAIRS broadcasting system assumes that different information is broadcasted 
between different Critical Infrastructures to provide an early alarm mechanism. Moreover, the 
different infrastructures use the same CIAIRS plug-in system, which increases the level of 
confidentiality, integrity, facilitates communication and the exchange of information.  
However, CIAIRS can communicate with different plug-in systems (displayed as com in Figure 
65). It would be interesting to see how CIAIRS can support broadcasting to different types of 
existing security systems. By integrating this method, this will save costs, as existing technology 
can be used.   
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Figure 65 the Future CIAIRS Broadcasting Process 
7.6.2 Automated Security Key 
Another assumption that was proposed in this thesis, is that the CIAIRS broadcasting system uses 
an operator in order to ensure a certain level of protection, confidentiality and integrity before the 
broadcasting process. In addition, checking and auditing any information before sending it to the 
other Critical Infrastructures is governed by the human operator.  
Figure 66 indicates how this process can function using an automated security key instead. For 
this, we envision that an authentication protocol can be used in a future design, in order to create 
a confidential channel between the different systems. This protocol allows the different Critical 
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Infrastructures to communicate and share the different information over a non-secure network by 
using “tickets” to prove their identity. Although, the use of a protocol ensures a high level of 
security during the broadcasting scheme, this strategy needs more investigation in order to evaluate 
the level of efficiency toward our system.  
 
Figure 66 the Future CIAIRS Automated Security Channel 
7.6.3 International Interdependency Support 
Although the simulation was modelled on a real system, it is possible to expand the approach and 
construct additional infrastructures in order to assess the effect of international interconnectivity. 
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This would be an ideal expansion of the study. The benefit of using international interdependencies 
would mean that the effects of service provision across borders could be assessed. 
It could be interesting to consider this model with different importance, for example, depending 
on their size or their international support. This model would help with understanding very 
complex problems, and potentially offer global recommendations. However, we need to bear in 
mind the cost, the different technical approaches and regulation measures in each country to be 
able to expand the simulation model. 
7.6.4 CIAIRS in a Real Experiment 
This research has measured the performance of the CIAIRS framework through simulation. The 
simulation helped in evaluating the performance of CIAIRS; but this approach will not replace a 
reality investigation. Therefore, it would be a great benefit to consider the effectiveness of the 
system using real-world critical infrastructure data. This would not only test the effectiveness of 
the system, but it would act as a test for the simulation environment to support its realism. 
Just to emphasise how important this point could be a short phone interview was made with one 
of the Project Managers in the Ministry of Water and Electricity in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The 
interview focused on understanding the different attacks that the system faces and how they are 
handled. Moreover, what are the problems they are facing and if the interdependency in the water 
system is clear. Depending on the outcomes of the semi-structured interview, considering this point 
as a future work would give the system more credibility and would add more benefit especially for 
security researchers.  
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7.7 Concluding Remarks 
Critical Infrastructures play a significant role in the world around us. Their service provision has 
become more widespread, to the point where it is ubiquitous in many societies. Infrastructure is 
the main source of development and economic construction process of any country. The Critical 
Infrastructure complexity introduced by interconnectivity is one of the significant challenges faced 
by distributed systems. By supporting interconnected networks, the system helps prevent the 
spreading the cyber-attacks within Critical Infrastructure interconnected networks. It is important 
to protect the assets and maintain their conditions under any circumstances. 
Due to this increased connectivity, now, more than ever before, Critical Infrastructures face a 
number of possible digital threats. As a result, CIP has become a significant topic for research 
focus. 
Our research presents a technique for the detection of abnormal behaviour within Critical 
Infrastructures and offers an approach for sharing the information with other infrastructures, based 
on the human immune system as a reference model. In addition, the development and evaluation 
of CIAIRS is presented. In order to reach the aim of this research a highly comprehensive 
simulation program is developed using Siemens Tecnomatix. The simulation put forward can be 
used to create substantial datasets. Systems, such as CIAIRS can assist to counter the growing 
cyber-threats and the risk of cascading failures. The research indicates the CIAIRS’s framework. 
The various components and mechanisms were highlighted in order to presents the role of the 
CIAIRS, which shares information with other infrastructures, to create a distributed support 
network for enhanced cyber-security. Finally, a new solution was presented in this research, known 
as CIAIRS, for sharing recommendations within a network of interconnected Critical 
Infrastructures.   
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APPENDIX A-DATA 
 
 
To provide a bigger view regarding the Data, a large sample of the normal and abnormal datasets 
are presented for two Critical Infrastructures, the Hydroelectricity System and the Electricity 
System, as an example. In addition, the faults presented for both systems.   
Tecnomatix Simulator Data  
Hydroelectricity System  
Table 26: The Hydroelectricity System Abnormal Behaviour 
Failure Components   Available Not 
Available 
1 
Water pipe 1 40 60 
Turbine 50 50 
Table 27: Component Descriptive for The Hydroelectricity System 
Abbreviation  Components Description  
F1 water pipe from the Swage system to the Hydroelectricity 
system in the Hydroelectricity 
F2 buffer in the Hydroelectricity system 
F3 water pipe 1 from sewage in the Hydroelectricity system  
F4 sluice-gate in the hydroelectricity system  
F5 water pipe 2 in the Hydroelectricity 
F6 the turbine in the Hydroelectricity system  
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F7 hydroelectricity generator 
F8 hydroelectricity transformer 
F9 electricity cable in the hydroelectricity system 
Table 28: Large Data Sample for Normal Hydroelectricity System 
Time F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
42:33.5 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:33.8 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:34.0 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:34.2 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:34.5 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:34.7 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:35.0 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:35.3 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:35.5 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:35.8 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:36.0 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:36.3 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:36.5 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:36.7 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:37.0 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:37.3 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:37.5 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:37.7 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:38.0 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:38.3 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:38.5 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:38.8 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:39.0 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:39.3 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:39.5 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:39.7 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:40.0 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
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42:40.3 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:40.5 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:40.7 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:41.0 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:41.2 0 21 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
Table 29: Large Data Sample for Abnormal Hydroelectricity System 
Time  F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
42:33.5 3 40 3 40 3 1 0 1 1 
42:33.8 3 40 3 40 3 0 1 1 1 
42:34.0 3 40 3 40 3 0 1 1 1 
42:34.2 3 40 3 40 3 0 1 1 1 
42:34.5 3 40 3 40 3 0 1 1 1 
42:34.7 3 40 3 40 3 0 1 1 1 
42:35.0 3 40 3 40 3 0 1 1 1 
42:35.3 3 40 3 40 3 0 1 1 1 
42:35.5 3 40 3 40 3 0 1 1 1 
42:35.8 3 40 3 40 2 1 1 1 0 
42:36.0 3 40 2 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:36.3 3 40 2 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:36.5 2 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:36.7 2 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:37.0 2 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:37.3 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:37.5 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:37.7 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:38.0 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:38.3 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:38.5 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:38.8 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:39.0 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:39.3 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:39.5 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:39.7 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
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42:40.0 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:40.3 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:40.5 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:40.7 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:41.0 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
42:41.2 3 40 3 40 3 1 1 1 0 
Electricity System  
Table 30: The Electricity System Abnormal Behaviour 
Failure  Components  Available Not Available 
1 
Electricity cable 
from nuclear 
power 
70 30 
Electricity cable 
to water 
distribution 
60 40 
Electricity cable 
to factory 
80 20 
Table 31: Component Descriptive for The Electricity System 
Abbreviation  Components Descriptions  
F1 electricity cable from the hydroelectricity to the SmartGrid 
in the Grid 
F2 electricity cable from the Nuclear to the SmartGrid in the 
Grid 
F3 electricity cable from the Coal to the SmartGrid in the Grid 
F4 the buffer in the SmartGrid 
F5 electricity cable from the SmartGrid to the Factory in the 
Grid 
F6 electricity cable from the SmartGrid to the Houses in the 
Grid 
F7 electricity cable from the SmartGrid to the WD in the Grid 
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Table 32: Large Data Sample for Normal Electricity System 
Time F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 
1:22:48:12.7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:13.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:13.2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:13.5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:13.7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:14.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1:22:48:14.2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1:22:48:14.5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1:22:48:14.7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1:22:48:15.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:15.2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:15.5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:15.7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:16.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:16.2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:16.5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:16.7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:17.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:17.2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:17.5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:17.7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:18.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:18.2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:18.5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:18.7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:19.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:19.2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:19.5000 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:19.7500 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:20.0000 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:20.2500 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:20.5000 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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1:22:48:20.7500 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:21.0000 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1:22:48:21.2500 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1:22:48:21.5000 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1:22:48:21.7500 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Table 33: Large Data Sample for Abnormal Electricity System 
Time  F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 
1:22:48:12.7500 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:13.0000 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:13.2500 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:13.5000 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:13.7500 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:14.0000 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:14.2500 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
1:22:48:14.5000 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
1:22:48:14.7500 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
1:22:48:15.0000 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
1:22:48:15.2500 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
1:22:48:15.5000 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
1:22:48:15.7500 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
1:22:48:16.0000 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
1:22:48:16.2500 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
1:22:48:16.5000 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
1:22:48:16.7500 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
1:22:48:17.0000 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
1:22:48:17.2500 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
1:22:48:17.5000 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
1:22:48:17.7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:18.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:18.2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1:22:48:18.5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1:22:48:18.7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1:22:48:19.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
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1:22:48:19.2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1:22:48:19.5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:19.7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:20.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:20.2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:20.5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:20.7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:21.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:21.2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:21.5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1:22:48:21.7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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APPENDIX B-FIGURES 
 
This section presents the Simulation Plant for the Hydroelectricity System and the Electricity 
System. Figure 67 and 68 demonstrates the abnormal flow in Hydroelectricity and the Electricity 
systems, respectively, depending on the abnormal behaviour introduced to the components, which 
are presented in Table 29 & 33. A Bottleneck Analyser presents a statistical data graphically on 
top of each component.     
 
Figure 67 The abnormal behaviour in the Hydroelectricity System: Water pipe 1 & Turbine. 
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Figure 68 The Abnormal Behaviour in the Electricity System: electricity cable from the Nuclear 
system, electricity cable to the Factory and the Houses 
Figure 69 and 70 indicates the abnormal behaviour for the Hydroelectricity and the Electricity 
systems, respectively, effect on the rest of the components.  
 
Figure 69 The Abnormal Chart for the Hydroelectricity System: Water pipe 1 & Turbine 
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Figure 70 The Abnormal Chart for the Electricity System  
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APPENDIX C-RECORDS 
 
This section presents the full 864 vector records for both the normal and abnormal water distribution system.  
Table 34 The Normal Water Distribution System Vector Records 
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Table 35 The Abnormal Water Distribution System Vector Records 
 
